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RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND MANDATORY HIV
TESTING OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND
NEWBORNS
Jennifer Sinton"
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether pregnant women or their newborn
infants should be mandatorily tested for the human immuno-
deficiency virus ("HIV")' has been publicly debated in state and
federal legislatures, public health communities and the media the
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 1998; A.B., Brown University, 1992.
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ears and for their emotional endurance, Ruth Kalbitzer and Ariadne Sacharofffor
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Gaffey for being a comrade and Ross Levi for his editorial talent and advocacy.
This Note assumes the following definitions for HIV testing schemes.
Mandatory testing is compulsory and cannot be refused by the subject. See Linda
Farber Post, Note, Unblinded Mandatory HIV Screening of Newborns: Care or
Coercion?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 169, 170 n.4 (1994). In the mandatory testing
schemes referred to, the subject is informed of the test result. If a newborn tests
positive for HIV, it is automatically known that the mother is HIV-positive and
the parents or guardians are informed of the result. See id. at 173. Therefore,
when a newborn is tested for HIV without the mother's consent and the mother
is subsequently informed of the result, the mother has effectively been subjected
to mandatory testing because her HIV status has been identified. See id.
Mandatory testing differs from blinded testing or screening. See id. at 171-
72 n. 12. Routine HIV testing of newborns has been performed by most states for
many years under blinded testing and blinded screening laws. See id. at 171.
Under these state programs, which are supported by the Centers for Disease
Control ("CDC") and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Devel-
opment, newborns are tested without the consent or knowledge of their mothers,
and the mothers are not informed of the result. See id. at 171-72 n. 11. Test
results remain completely anonymous and the tests are only conducted for
epidemiological, i.e., statistical, purposes. See id. at 171-72.
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last few years.2 The public debate is characterized by proponents
of mandatory testing as a fight between fetal rights and women's
rights.3 The debate has also been viewed as a conflict between
what is best for the public health, namely, preventing IV
transmission, and preserving the civil liberties and privacy rights of
women.4 While opponents of mandatory testing have argued that
mandatory testing is bad public health policy that harms women
and children, proponents have ignored these assertions and drawn
attention to opponents' legal arguments, that mandatory testing
violates women's privacy rights, autonomy and freedom of
choice.' Proponents of mandatory testing argue that civil libertari-
ans and feminists who seek to preserve women's rights have failed
to consider the public health consequences of allowing women to
seek testing voluntarily.6 For proponents, the health of an infant
and the general public is paramount and infants, as "innocents,"
have rights that are more important than the privacy rights of
women.8 Proponents argue that a woman has a "right to know"
that she is infected with HIV,9 as opposed to the idea that a
2 See infra Section I (providing background on the mandatory testing
debate).
' See Post, supra note 1, at 170-71 ("[T]his issue predictably has come to
be framed in terms of maternal-child rights.").
4 See Martha A. Field, Pregnancy and AIDS, 52 MD. L. REV. 402, 422-23
(1993) (stating that the mandatory HIV testing issue is often framed as one in
which society must choose between public health and civil liberties).
' See infra note 99 and accompanying text (referring to claims that
women's rights are violated by mandatory testing).
6 See Nat Hentoff, The New Tuskegee Experiment: Infected Has a Right to
Be Told-No Matter What the ACLU Says, VILLAGE VOIcE, Oct. 1, 1996, at 8
(arguing that the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and other opponents
of mandatory testing have attempted to mislead the public).
' See Gretchen Buchenholz, HIV Babies Have Rights, Too, N.Y. DAILY
NEWs, Jan. 18, 1994, at 15C.
' Gretchen Buchenholz, Director of the Association to Benefit Children,
states that the "sacrifice of defenseless children on the altar of political
expediency and special interests can no longer be tolerated." Gretchen
Buchenholz, N.Y. DAILY NEws, Mar. 17, 1995, at 37. Buchenholz identifies
these "special interest" groups as "women's, minority and gay groups." Id.
9 See Letta Tayler, New Rights for Moms in HIV Tests: Critics Fear Its
Use, Abuse, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1995, at A4.
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woman has the right to decide for herself. Further, proponents
believe that protecting a woman's "right not to know" her LilV
status is a "perversion of human rights" that injures both women
and the general public health.'° In this debate, the public emphasis
on the relative rights of women, fetuses and infants" has resulted
10 See Robert T. Jensen, HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns,
265 JAMA 1525 (1991) (letter to the editor) ("[T]o have a national or
international policy that enables people at risk of being infected with HIV
voluntarily to choose not to know whether they carry HIV, a fatal, sexually
transmitted disease, is a perversion of human rights and a formula for HIV
disaster.").
" The mandatory HIV testing debate is only one of several public debates
about the relative rights of women and their children. For example, the abortion
debate exemplifies how fetal rights are used to temper the rights of women.
Recently, the prosecution of women for fetal endangerment has also been hotly
debated. See, e.g., Stephen Buttry, Fetal Endangerment Issue Heats Up: Mother
Cleared, New Law Urged, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June 18, 1993, at 13SF
(quoting a judge who said that "[s]ociety's interest in healthy children,
preservation of life, and the potentiality of the young should clearly override the
concern of treatment of the alcoholic mother"); Help, Not Hostility, Is Needed,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Oct. 23, 1990, at 20 (arguing that pregnant and
childbearing addicts need help rather than punishment and that fetal endanger-
ment prosecutions weaken families). Our culture also seems to have a new
fascination for stories of young mothers who give birth and harm or kill their
infants. See, e.g., Marie McCullough, Why Would Anyone Throw Away a
Newborn Baby?, BuFFALO NEws, June 15, 1997, at H5 (noting that one law
professor has found a "historical connection between infant murders and
crackdowns on abortion, birth control and out-of-wedlockpregnancy"); Katharine
Q. Seelye, What Leads Young Women to Kill Their Newborns?, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, June 18, 1997, at I (exploring the psychological reasons that
might motivate a woman to kill her newborn); Paul Wilborn, Profiling Mothers
Who Abandon or Kill Babies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 4, 1997, at IA
(noting several recent cases of women who harmed their newborns); George
Will, Wicked Act of Tossing Baby in Trash Bin, DES MOINES REG., June 18,
1997, at 9 (blaming women, school condom dispensers, television, popular music,
the pro-choice movement and "today's abortion culture, with its casual creation
and destruction of life," for the recent flurry of infant deaths). The proliferation
of such popular narratives and the intense scrutiny under which we place these
mothers reflect a cultural preoccupation with the stereotype of the indifferent and
selfish mother. This bad mother is perceived to be the root of at least two of
contemporary society's greatest ills, drug addiction and the disintegration of the
nuclear family.
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in a circular discourse which precludes consideration of the harmful
effects of mandatory testing on Black and Hispanic and low-income
women and children, who are disproportionately affected by HIV
infection.' 2
12 The AIDS epidemic has a disproportionate effect on the Black and
Hispanic communities. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US.
Public Health Service Recommendations for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Counseling and Voluntary Testing for Pregnant Women, MORBIDITY AND
MORTALITY WKLY. REP., July 7, 1995, at 2 [hereinafter CDC Guidelines]. While
AIDS was the fourth leading cause of death among all women between ages 25
and 44 in 1993, AIDS was the leading cause of death for Black women and the
third leading cause of death for Hispanic women in this age group. See id In
1991, AIDS was the seventh leading cause of death for children between ages
one and four, but AIDS was the second leading cause of death for Black children
in New Jersey, Massachusetts, New York and Florida, and the second leading
cause of death for Hispanic children in New York. See id. In 1994, 77% of
AIDS cases among women occurred in Black and Hispanic women. See Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, Update: AIDS Among Women-United
States, 1994, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Feb. 10, 1995, at 1. The
rate of AIDS cases for Black women was 16 times higher than that for White
women; the rate for Hispanic women was seven times higher than that for White
women. See id.
The latest statistics show that these racial disparities continue. In 1996,
AIDS cases among Whites dropped by 13%, but only dropped by 5% among
Hispanics and did not decrease at all among Black populations. See Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, US. Says AIDS Cases Fell in '96, Ending 16-Year Rise, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 1997, at A26 (reporting CDC findings). Disparities in the demographics
also encompass class, as most HIV-infected women are poor and have limited
access to health care. See id. In addition, the number of new AIDS cases in
women rose 2% between 1995 and 1996, but the number of new cases in men
declined by 8%. See id.
Because of the disproportionate impact that AIDS has on low-income, Black
and Hispanic women, the mandatory testing issue has race and class implications,
as well as gender implications. This Note analyzes mandatory testing with the
perspective that most women who are identified as HIV-positive through
mandatory testing programs will probablybe poor, Black and Hispanic. Although
the term "women of color" is broader than the Black and Hispanic women who
are disproportionately impacted by HIV, I frequently use this term because it
acknowledges that the categories "Black" and "Hispanic" women are not
necessarilymutually exclusive or easily determined. I use the terms "low-income
women" and "women of color" in conjunction to emphasize the different axes
of race and class. However, these categories are also not mutually exclusive.
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This Note argues that mandatory testing harms both women and
children, principally because coercive medical policies drive women
from health care, and that mandatory testing is not clearly justified
by recent medical advances in AIDS treatments.1 3 This Note
shows how rights discourses have enabled the justification of the
mandatory testing policy and made criticism of this policy difficult.
Part I of this Note provides background on the issue of mandatory
HJV testing for infants and pregnant women and reviews recent
federal legislation which may result in nationwide mandatory
testing. Part II outlines the major problems with mandatory testing
and shows why mandatory testing constitutes bad public health
policy. Part III surveys the rhetoric of mandatory testing and shows
that the public debate has been limited to a struggle between fetal
rights, or saving babies, and women's rights of autonomy and
privacy. Part IV examines how rights discourse constructs opposi-
tion between women and children, results in the blaming of women
for larger societal problems and veils the racist impetus behind
mandatory testing. Part V discusses the problems of arguing for the
abandonment of rights discourse, but contends that opponents
should continue their efforts to re-frame the public debate by
exposing mandatory testing as a flawed public health policy and a
hasty, ill-advised attempt to make up for previous failures of
government and community to address the needs of affected women
and children. This Note concludes that if opponents of mandatory
testing can move the focus away from the relative rights of women,
fetuses and newborns, mandatory testing will be exposed as a
seriously flawed policy behind which lie only the workings of
power, coercion and racism.
I. BACKGROUND
During most of the first decade of the AIDS epidemic, AIDS
activists were largely successful in thwarting proposals to mandate
Most of the women affected by HIV are both poor and women of color.
13 See infra Section II (explaining the negative effects of mandatory testing
on women and children and questioning the assumption that infants will benefit
from new AIDS treatments).
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HIV testing and to initiate other coercive measures such as
quarantines.'4 They argued that discrimination against infected
individuals was so widespread that it would be unjust to forcibly
compel testing."5 In addition, public health officials and health
care workers generally agreed that people at risk for infection are
more likely to seek health care when HIV testing is consensual and
anonymity or confidentiality is assured.'6 As a result, many states
" See Field, supra note 4, at 405 n.8 (discussing involuntary testing and
quarantine proposals). The fact that in 1993 only federal prisoners were forcibly
administered HIV tests evidences that mandatory testing proposals were, until
recently, unsuccessful. See Mireya Navarro, Testing Newborns for AIDS Virus
Raises Issue of Mothers' Privacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 8, 1993, at Al (discussing
the conflict between mandatory testing proposals and informed consent laws).
Proposals to quarantine people with AIDS early in the epidemic were denounced
by the scientific community as unnecessary and absurd. See Bernadette P. Sadler,
Comment, When Rape Victims' Rights Meet Privacy Rights: Mandatory HIV
Testing, Striking the Fourth Amendment Balance, 67 WASH. L. REv. 195 (1992).
It has been suggested that the "panic response" to AIDS is "due to the fear
underlying societal taboos related to human sexuality, social stigma, helplessness,
mental illness, and death." Field, supra note 4, at 405 n.8; David I. Schulman,
AIDS Discrimination: Its Nature, Meaning and Function, 12 NOVA. L. REv.
1113, 1115-17 (1988).
" When the AIDS epidemic first hit the gay male community in the 1980s,
the first policy initiatives were aimed at protecting HIV-positive gay men from
homophobia and discrimination. See Juliet J. McKenna, Where Ignorance Is Not
Bliss: A Proposal for Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women, 7 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 133, 147 n.56 (1996). One has to wonder if the general success
that the gay male community had in protecting themselves from coercive,
discriminatory measures is due in part to the relative political currency and
economic power of that community. Because poor women and women of color
suffer greater political and economic disadvantages, it is more difficult for them
to affect legislative policy and combat coercivemeasures. See Lynda Richardson,
Progress on AIDS Brings Movement for Less Secrecy, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 21,
1997, at Al, B4 (quoting Ronald Bayer, Professor, Columbia University School
of Public Health: 'There is no question in my mind, had it been an epidemic of
poor black and Hispanic drug users early on, that the contours of public health
policy would have looked very different, much more authoritarian to begin with,
less commitment and respect for notions of informed consent and privacy."').
16 See Larry Gostin, Screeningfor AIDS: Efficacy, Cost, and Consequences,
2 AIDS & PuB. POL'Y J. 14, 14-15 (1987) (stating that "[s]pecific consent based
on information about HIV infection has been considered a requisite part of HIV
antibody testing since the earliest public recommendations of the Public Health
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enacted statutes and promulgated regulations which ensure
confidentiality for those tested for HIV1 7 and allow testing only
with the subject's consent.18
Service," and outlining a similar position adopted by the World Health
Organization); Navarro, supra note 14, at Al (stating that AIDS experts believe
that "the epidemic can be slowed only through changes in behavior that require
the cooperation of those infected").
17 See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Case Against Compulsory Casefinding
in Controlling AIDS - Testing, Screening and Reporting, 12 AM. J.L. & MED.
7, 47 n.201 (1986) [hereinafter Gostin, Compulsory Casefinding]. By 1989,
almost half the states had statutes ensuring confidentiality for AIDS-related
information. See Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professional, and AIDS:
The 'Right to Know' the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 MD. L.
REV. 12, 47 (1989) [hereinafter Gostin, Hospitals].
1" See Suzanne Sangree, Control of Childbearing by HIV-Positive Women:
Some Responses to Emerging Legal Policies, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 309, 367 (1993).
By 1993, thirty states required that a patient specifically consent to an HIV test
because of the "potentially grave psychological and social significance" of an
HIV test. See id. The legislative intent of the New York confidentiality and
consent law expresses the rationale behind confidentiality and consent require-
ments as follows:
The legislature recognizes that maximum confidentiality pro-
tection for information related to [HV and AIDS] is an essential
public health measure. In order to retain the full trust and confidence
of persons at risk, the state has an interest both in assuring that HIV
related information is not improperly disclosed and in having clear and
certain rules for the disclosure of such information. By providing
additional protection of the confidentiality of IRV related information,
the legislature intends to encourage the expansion of voluntary
confidential testing for [HIV] so that individuals may come forward,
learn of their health status, make decisions regarding the appropriate
treatment, and change the behavior that puts them and others at risk of
infection.
The legislature also recognizes that strong confidentiality
protections can limit the risk of discrimination and the harm to an
individual's interest in privacy that unauthorized disclosure of HV
related information can cause. It is the intent of the legislature that
exceptions to the general rule of confidentiality of HIV related
information be strictly construed.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2780 (McKinney 1988). See § 2781 for the consent
requirements and § 2782 for confidentiality provisions.
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In recent years, proposals for the mandatory testing of specific
groups of people, for example, those groups presumed more likely
to transmit HIV, have gained support.' 9 Because women can
transmit HIV to fetuses in utero and to infants during and after
birth,20 women and newborns have become highly-targeted groups
for mandatory HIV testing.2' Proposals for the mandatory testing
of pregnant women and newborns further intensified following a
" Such groups include sex offenders, prisoners, sex workers, athletes and
health care workers and patients. See generally Gostin, Hospitals, supra note 17,
at 12 (discussing proposals to mandate testing for health workers and patients);
Jennifer L. Johnston, Is Mandatory HIV Testing of Professional Athletes Really
the Solution?, 4 HEALTH MATRIX 159 (1994) (athletes); Kathleen Knepper,
Responsibility of Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the
HIV Virus in Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT
45 (1995) (prisoners); David Kennon Moody, Note, AIDS and Rape: The
Constitutional Dimensions of Mandatory Testing of Sex Offenders, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 238 (1990) (sex offenders); James Grant Snell, Mandatory HIV Testing
and Prostitution: The World's Oldest Profession and the World's Newest Deadly
Disease, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 1565 (1994) (sex workers).
20 HIV can be transmitted by four bodily fluids: blood, semen, vaginal
secretions and breast milk. See Michael A. Grizzi, Recent Developments:
Compelled Antiviral Treatment of HIV Positive Pregnant Women, 5 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 473, 479 n.22 (1995) (discussing the mechanics of vertical
transmission). Most commonly, HIV is transmitted by the intermingling of bodily
fluids during sexual intercourse and when intravenous drug users share needles.
Id. at 479. In what is termed "vertical transmission," women can transmit HIV
to a fetus in the womb, during delivery or after birth, if an HIV-infected woman
breast-feeds. Id. at 479-80.
21 Taunya Lovell Banks, Women and AIDS - Racism, Sexism, and Classism,
17 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 353 (1990) (exploring the discrimi-
natory implications of mandatory testing). The focus on women has increased as
the numbers of women and infants infected with HIV have surged, and at a time
when AIDS cases are increasing at a greater rate among women than men. See
Deborah L. Shelton, Is It the Time. . . , AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 2, 1996, at 23.
While women represented 7% of AIDS cases in 1985, they represented 19% in
1995. Id. Currently, almost all cases of HIV infection in infants are the result of
vertical transmission. See Robin D. Gorsky et al., Preventing Perinatal
Transmission of HIV - Cost and Effectiveness of a Recommended Intervention,
PUB. HEALTH REP., July-Aug. 1996, at 335. Each year approximately 7,000
infants are born to HIV-infected women nationwide. See S.F. Davis et al., 274
JAMA 952-55 (1995). It is estimated that 15 to 30% of these infants will become
infected in the absence of intervention. See Gorsky, supra, at 335.
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1994 study, commonly referred to as Clinical Trial 076. This study
found that administering zidovudine ("AZT")22 to HIV-positive
pregnant women before and during childbirth and then adminis-
tering AZT to newborns after birth decreased the newborns'
chances of becoming HIV-infected by 67.5%, as compared to those
infants born without the administration of AZT.23 The ability of
AZT therapy to reduce perinatal transmission' has increased
support for mandatory testing.
In July 1995, the CDC published Public Health Service
guidelines recommending that all health care providers counsel
pregnant women to voluntarily test for HI. 25 The CDC guide-
22 AZT is the most widely used brand of the drug zidovudine, which is also
known as ZDV. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at ii. Zidovudine is referred
to as AZT throughout the text.
' See Edward M. Connor et al., Reduction of Maternal-Infant Transmission
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type I with Zidovudine Treatment, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1173 (1994) (presenting the findings of Clinical Trial 076). In
Clinical Trial 076, 8.3% of infants who had been treated with AZT during
prenatal, perinatal and postnatal phases were HIV-infected at 18 months, whereas
25.5% of infants who had not been treated with AZT were infected at 18
months. Id. These statistics evidence that without AZT treatment, approximately
one quarter of infants born to HIV-infected mothers become infected with IV.
24 Perinatal transmission is commonly defined as the transmission of HIV
from mother to child that occurs before, during or after birth. See DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MED. DICTIONARY 1511 (27th ed. 1988).
' See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 1. The CDC includes in its
numerous recommendations that: "[h] ealth-care providers should ensure that all
pregnant women are counseled and encouraged to be tested for HIV infection";
"HIV testing of pregnant women and their infants should be voluntary";
"[h]ealth-careproviders should counsel and offer HIV testing to women as early
in the pregnancy as possible so that informed and timely therapeutic and
reproductive decisions can be made"; "[u]ninfected pregnant women who
continue to practice high-risk behaviors ... should be encouraged to avoid
further exposure to HIV"; "[t]he prevalence of HIV infection may be higher in
women who have not received prenatal care" and "[t]hese women should be
assessed promptly for HIV infection"; "HIV-infected pregnant women should
receive counseling," including an "assessment of the potential for negative effects
resulting from HIV infection (e.g., discrimination, domestic violence, and
psychological difficulties)"; counseling should include advice concerning options
for medication and assistance in identifying and referral for support networks;
and there be adequate provisions for follow-up for HIV-infected women and their
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lines intentionally rejected mandatory testing because it is coercive
and encourages women to avoid prenatal care.26
In 1996, Congress for the first time addressed the issue of
mandatory HIV testing of newborns and pregnant women by
amending the Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act,
popularly known as the Ryan White CARE Act, which was enacted
in 1990 to provide emergency funding for cities that are dispropor-
tionately affected by the AIDS epidemic." These amendments are
aimed at reducing the number of HIV-infected infants28 and
children when necessary. CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 8-11.
26 The CDC states the following policy reasons:
Data from universal, routine HIV counseling and voluntary testing
programs in several areas indicate that high test-acceptance levels can
be achievedwithout mandatingtesting. Mandatory testing may increase
the potential for negative consequences of HIV testing and result in
some women avoiding prenatal care altogether. In addition, mandatory
testing may adversely affectthe patient-provider relationship by placing
the provider in an enforcing rather than facilitating role. Providers
must act as facilitators to adequately assist women in making decisions
regarding HIV testing and ZDV [AZT] preventive therapy. Although
few studies have addressed the issue of acceptance of HIV testing,
higher levels of acceptancehave been found in clinics where testing is
voluntary but recommended by the health-care provider than in clinics
that use a nondirective approach to HIV testing (i.e, [sic] patients are
told the test is available, but testing is neither encouraged nor
discouraged).
CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 6 [citations omitted].
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff-33,-37 (1996). The Act seeks to improve the quality
and availability of care for communities affected by HIV, to provide early
intervention services such as counseling and testing and to offer primary care.
See 42 U.S.C. § 300 et seq. (1990). The Act is the federal government's primary
response to the AIDS epidemic and the funds it authorizes are crucial to state
AIDS programs. See Christina Kent, States Pushed to Test Newborns for HIV,
AM. MED. NEWS, May 27, 1996, at 1 (quoting a state official who said: "'In
many states, the only source of money for AIDS is Ryan White."').
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-33. Congress stated in its findings that "[r]esearch
studies and statewide clinical experiences have demonstrated that administration
of anti-retroviral medication during pregnancy can significantly reduce the
transmission of [IHlV] from an infected mother to her baby." Id. Congress also
pointed out that HIV testing, "without access to such counseling, treatment, and
services will not improve the health of the woman or the child." Id.
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require all states to conform to the amended Act or risk losing
federal financing available under the Act.2 9
Specifically, the amendments required that states adopt the CDC
guidelines recommending HIV counseling and voluntary testing of
all pregnant women by September 1996.30 At that time, the CDC
implemented a reporting system in order for states to determine the
annual rate of AIDS cases resulting from perinatal transmission.3
In the latter half of 1998, the CDC must publish a determination of
whether mandatory testing of newborns or pregnant women is a
routine practice nationwide. 32 If the CDC determines that manda-
tory testing is a nationwide practice, a state will lose its funding
unless it can show one of the following: 1) a 50% reduction in the
rate of new AIDS cases as a result of perinatal transmission as
compared to 1993 rates; 2) at least 95% of women in the state who
have been to at least two prenatal visits have volunteered for HIV
testing; or 3) the state has enacted or promulgated mandatory HIV
testing requirements for newborns or pregnant women.33
States unwilling to implement mandatory testing face a heavy
burden of showing that either 95% of pregnant women are
consenting to testing,34 or that there has been a 50% reduction in
29 See id. § 300ff-33(b) (declaring that a state "shall not be eligible to
receive assistance for HIV counseling and testing" until certification of
compliance with the amendments is provided).
30 See id. § 300ff-33(a) ("[A] State shall, not later than 120 days after May
20, 1996, certify to the Secretary that such State has in effect regulations or
measures to adopt the guidelines issued by the [CDC] concerning recommen-
dations for [HIV] counseling and voluntary testing for pregnant women.").
Congress has authorized a total of $10 million per year through the year 2000
in order to assist the states in carrying out this mandate. See id. § 300ff-33(c)(2).
3' See id. § 300ff-34.
32 See id. §§ 300ff-34, -35.
3 See id. § 300ff-34(e)(2).
34 In theory, it is conceivable that 95% of pregnant women, if aggressively
and appropriately counseled, would voluntarily agree to an HIV test. In fact,
according to state health officials, one such counseling program at Harlem
Hospital resulted in 95% of pregnant women volunteering to test for HIV. See
Navarro, supra note 14, at Al. At Grady Hospital in Atlanta, 96% of approxi-
mately 3600 women agreed to be tested as part of their prenatal care. See
Shelton, supra note 21, at 23. Despite these successes, proponents of mandatory
testing assume that pregnant women do not want to know their HIV status or that
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the rate of HIV-positive newborns. Although this showing will only
be required if the CDC determines that mandatory testing is a
routine practice nationwide, such a determination may be likely
because the Act itself encourages mandatory testing policies.3"
Under the amendments, states can avoid the potential burden by
immediately adopting mandatory testing.36 Thus, while the
amendments appear to give the states time and discretion in
determining whether to adopt mandatory testing, states are in fact
encouraged to enact mandatory testing laws immediately, in order
to avoid having to grapple with adopting aggressive counseling
policies and reducing the rate of new AIDS cases among
newborns."
of their children. See Post, supra note 1, at 197 (stating that the New York bill
for mandatory testing of newborns "appears predicated on the assumption that
women will refuse to be tested voluntarily" and that "[i]mplicit in the bill's
language and legislative intent is the notion that coercion is the only way to get
women to do what is in their children's best interest"); Shelton, supra note 21,
at 23 (noting that women have not been adequately counseled to test for HIV,
but are being blamed for not seeking testing); infra notes 146-55 and accom-
panying text (discussing the ways in which the government and community have
historically failed to adequately address the needs of women with FIV and have
subsequently punished women by increasing the regulation of their bodies). It is
likely that the assumption that women are unwilling to be tested or do not care
about their children is motivated in part by race and class bias, because low-
income women and women of color are most affected by HIV and mandatory
testing. See Post, supra note 1, at 197 n.181.
'5 See Kent, supra note 27, at 1 (exploring the possible impact of the 1996
amendments and noting the confusion and controversy that the amendments have
caused).
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-37 (providing that any state that establishes
mandatory HIV testing prior to or after May 20, 1996 will not lose its funding).
Aimee Berenson, legislative counsel for AIDS Action Council, fears that in light
of the 1996 amendments, "state legislatures will implement mandatory testing
programs in order to protect themselves against the possible loss of vital Ryan
White CARE Act dollars." Kent, supra note 27, at 1.
17 In discussing the Ryan White amendments, Berenson states that the
"'language of this compromise presents Washington double-speak at its worst."'
Kent, supra note 27, at 1. While the Ryan White legislation appears to support
counseling and voluntary testing, it enables mandatory testing approaches as a
simple alternative, which takes away the incentive to establish strong and
effective voluntary programs. The 1996 amendments amount to a shoddy
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Since the Ryan White amendments were passed in 1996, New
York has already initiated mandatory HIV testing of all
newborns.3" While the debate over mandatory HIV testing for
newborns had been raging in New York for years,39 the 1996
compromise that makes little sense.
38 New York instituted mandatory testing of newborns by amending its
Public Health Law to exempt childbearing women and newborns from its
confidentiality and consent requirements, and to require the promulgation of
regulations that would mandate the testing of all newborns and parental
notification of the results. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2500-f, 2781-6(d)
(McKinney 1996). New York was the first state nationwide to enact a law
requiring the mandatory HIV testing of newborns. See Hentoff, supra note 6, at
8 (arguing that the New York law is justified because it enables HIV-infected
infants to gain access to health care and treatment). Under New York's program,
which has been in effect since February 1, 1997, newborns are tested for HIV
at birth and hospitals attempt to track down the mothers of HIV-exposed infants
several weeks after they leave the hospital. See Lynda Richardson, Critics Say
Mothers Get Little Help After H.I. V Notification, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 1997,
at B1. If and when the mothers are found, they "'are simply told they are H.I.V.
positive and given the names of programs they can turn to."' Id. at B2 (quoting
Marie St. Cyr, Executive Director of Iris House, a social service agency for HIV-
infected poor women in East Harlem). Because some hospitals are poorly
administering the program, some mothers are not even informed that the infant
is being tested and receive little or no counseling. See id. at B1-B2. When the
program began in February, a telephone information line concerning mandatory
testing was initiated. See id. at B2. As of June 1997, the hotline received about
60 complaints. See id.
" The bill to mandate testing of newborns, proposed by Nettie Mayersohn,
a Democratic Assembly Member from Flushing, was stalled in the New York
Assembly's Health Committee for over three years before it was made law. See
Nettie Mayersohn, HIV Mothers Need to Know, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Jan. 28, 1994,
at 54. During this period, the issue of mandatory HIV testing of newborns was
hotly contested in the press. See, e.g., Buchenholz, supra note 8, at 37 (arguing
that invasion of a mother's privacy "is morally justified where lives are at
stake"); Nat Hentoff, The Shame of Sheldon Silver, VILLAGE VOIcE, Aug. 1,
1995, at 18 (arguing that Speaker of the Assembly Sheldon Silver should be
ashamed for blocking the bill "that would have saved lives"); Mayersohn, supra,
at 54 (proposing that an alleged 85 to 91% voluntary testing success rate for
Health Department counseling and testing initiatives "is a fantasy"); Anna
Quindlen, Public & Private; The Baby Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1994, at A25
(remarking that mandatory testing "seems so right at first blush," but that it is
a complicated policy decision which is opposed by many AIDS providers who
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amendments apparently prompted the passage of the New York
law.40 Because New York often initiates legislative and judicial
understand the detrimental effects on women and children); Tayler, supra note
9, at A4 (noting criticisms of Pataki's plan to mandate testing).
The mandatory testing issue was also contested in the courtroom. See
Raymond Hernandez, Pataki's Plan to Offer Results of HIV Tests Is Assailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1995, at B2 [hereinafter Hernandez, Pataki's Plan]
(discussing a court settlement which resulted in Governor Pataki agreeing to
promulgate regulations for mandatory testing). Impatient with the Assembly's
failure to enact the amendment to the Public Health Law, the Association to
Benefit Children brought suit against Governor Pataki in April 1995 in an effort
to compel the Governor to institute mandatory HIV testing for newborns by
executive order or regulations. See id. As it was clear that Pataki himself wanted
a mandatory testing law or regulation, over thirty opponents of mandatory HIV
testing, including HIV Law Project, Housing Works and other local AIDS service
organizations, intervened as defendants. See Attorney General Vacco Agrees to
Violate Existing State Law to Mandate HIV Testing of All Women Giving Birth,
Press Advisory, Oct. 9, 1995, at 1 (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy).
With the intervenors being effectively excluded from all settlement negotiations,
the case was settled and the Governor agreed to promulgate regulations through
the Department of Health. See id.; Hernandez, Pataki's Plan, supra, at B2.
Commissioner of the Department of Health, Barbara DeBuono, subsequently
promulgated regulations and a new lawsuit was brought, with many of the former
intervenors as plaintiffs, to enjoin the regulations. See Tayler, supra note 9, at
A4. As this suit was being successfully litigated, the 1996 Ryan White
amendments were passed and Democratic party members of the State Assembly,
most notably Speaker of the Assembly Sheldon Silver, who had long been
opposed to the bill, caved in to political election year pressures and pushed the
bill through. See Raymond Hernandez, Pataki and Lawmakers Agree on Plan for
Testing Newborns for AIDS Virus, N.Y. TIMEs, June 6, 1996, at B8 [hereinafter
Hernandez, Pataki and Lawmakers]. Sheldon Silver had previously been credited
with blocking the passage of the mandatory testing for newborns legislation. See
Terry McGovern, Scarlet Letters, CITY LIMITs, Aug.-Sept. 1995, at 33 (arguing
that mandatory testing "will have a devastating effect on mothers and children").
40 When Governor Pataki and the New York State Assembly agreed to enact
mandatory testing of newborns, the New York Times wrote:
The unexpected agreement reached today was largely prompted by
recent Congressional efforts to require states to begin mandatory H.I.V.
testing of newborns-with the results disclosed to parents--unless state
health officials can reduce the number of infected infants born in the
next few years.
Both the House and the Senate passed a law last month that would
cut off Federal money for AIDS treatment to states that fail to comply
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trends in the rest of the country, it is likely other states will take
New York's lead and also enact statutes providing for mandatory
HIV testing of infants or pregnant women.4'
II. MANDATORY HIV TESTING DOES NOT PROTECT THE FETUS
OR THE NEWBORN AND DRIVES WOMEN FROM CARE
Many experts believe that mandatory testing and similar
coercive medical policies discourage women from seeking medical
care.42 This is particularly unfortunate because HIV infection may
with the requirements. Over all, New York receives more than $150
million a year from the Federal Government to treat people with AIDS
under the Ryan White act.
Hernandez, Pataki and Lawmakers, supra note 39, at B8.
"' Theresa McGovern, Legal Director of the HIV Law Project in New York,
believes that other states around the country have been closely watching what
happens in New York on this issue and that other states unfortunately will follow
what New York has done. See Shelton, supra note 21, at 23 (interviewing
McGovern). The HIV Law Project is now suing New York State over the
mandatory HIV testing of newborns law, because it has been "implemented in
a slipshod fashion, offering little support and poor counseling to the most
vulnerable women." Richardson, supra note 38, at B4.
42 Martha Field writes:
Even apart from issues of the rights of women who would be tested,
a powerful argument against imposing testing on particular groups, like
pregnant women, is that testing will not work to slow the spread of
HIV, or to accomplish any other legitimate government purpose. Not
only is universal precautions a more effective approach than the vain
effort to sort the population into infected and uninfected segments, but
also the attempt to impose testing on women who do not want it will
be counterproductive. If forced testing becomes part of prenatal care,
it will drive pregnant women who do not want to be tested away from
the other components of prenatal care as well. . . . If testing is a
condition of admission to the hospital, when women learn of that fact,
then women who do not want to be tested will simply give birth
elsewhere under less safe conditions.
Field, supra note 4, at 422.
Dr. Alfred J. Saah, Associate Professor of Epidemiology and Infectious
Diseases at Johns Hopkins University, writes:
The American Medical Association's [AMA] decision to recommend
mandatory H.I.V. testing in pregnant women ... is shameful. For it
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be most prevalent in those women who already lack access to
medical care, including prenatal care.43 The first question raised,
therefore, is whether a policy that mandates testing of pregnant
women will actually reach those likely to be infected. Furthermore,
mandatory testing of women who are able to obtain some form of
prenatal care, and of infants, does not guarantee access to LIV-
related medical care and treatment in the future." In fact, one
recent study found that White people with HIV in New York City
does not mandate treatment, which is the only way to reduce trans-
mission to newborns. If H.I.V. infection were a benign condition
without social, medical or employment consequences, testing could be
done with impunity. But in the absence of universal health care and
given that H.I.V. predominates in poor communities, mandatory testing
becomes another obstacle to obtaining prenatal care.
Alfred J. Saah, Forced HI. V Testing, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1996, at A14
(responding to the AMA's decision to endorse mandatory HIV testing of all
pregnant women). See Doctors Back AIDS Tests for Pregnant Women, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 28, 1996, at A20 (noting that the resolution of the AMA's policy-
making House of Delegates was passed by a very close vote of 185 to 181).
The New York courts have also acknowledged the potential danger of
coercive medical policies by ruling in favor of the position that "the voluntary
cooperation of high-risk individuals [in public health programs] .. . would be
chilled by the threat of mandatory testing despite assurances of confidentiality."
Matter of New York State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 555 N.Y.S.2d 911, 914
(App. Div., 3d Dep't 1990) (upholding the dismissal of a petition requesting that
AIDS be designated as a communicable and sexually transmitted disease), aff'd
572 N.E.2d 605 (N.Y. 1991).
"3 See HIV Testing and Counseling for Women: An Update, CONSULTANT,
May 1996, at 1049, 1050 (citing a study which found that the "prevalence of
HIV infection may be higher in women who have not received prenatal carethan
in those who have received such care").
41 One study in New York City found that identified HIV-exposed infants
may actually be receiving less medical care than infants who do not test positive
for HIV. See Betty Levin et al., Treatment Choices for Infants in the Neonatal
Intensive Care Unit at Riskfor AIDS, 265 JAMA 2976 (1991). In addition, mere
HIV testing and identification does not necessarily ensure the future provision of
adequate medical care as there is no universal health care system in this country.
See Nan D. Hunter, Complications of Gender: Women and HIVDisease, in AIDS
AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN CIVIL RIGHTS 5, 23-26 (Nan D. Hunter &
William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (discussing the unlikelihood that many HIV-
infected infants will receive adequate medical care).
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"are much more likely than [B]lack and Hispanic people to have
access to powerful new drugs that have revolutionized AIDS
treatment," which is especially unfortunate given that Black and
Hispanic individuals are "considered most in need of advanced
treatments.
45
Proponents of mandatory testing argue that because most HIV-
infected pregnant women have no access to prenatal care, newborn
testing is sometimes the only opportunity to identify HIV-positive
infants.46 In addition, proponents assert that the results of Clinical
Trial 076"7 and the increasing success of new drug therapies
warrant compulsory testing of newborns. 48 Although the relative
success of the new therapies does strengthen proponents' argu-
ments, the extent to which infants benefit from new therapies is
exaggerated.
First, the new drug therapies, commonly referred to as triple
combination therapies or drug cocktails, do not benefit infants as
they do adults.49 Although there are eleven government-approved
drugs used in combination therapies for adults, there are only six
for children.50 In addition, children may tend to fail a particular
" Lynda Richardson, White Patients Have More Access to New AIDS Drugs,
A Survey Shows, N.Y. TiMES, July 27, 1997, § 1, at 25.
46 See Ruth R. Faden et al., HIV Infection, Pregnant Women, and Newborns:
A Policy Proposal for Information and Testing, in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE
NEXT GENERATION 331, 335-36 (Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991) (stating that
many commentators justify mandatory HIV testing for newborns on the grounds
that such testing provides the last chance to identify a potentially infected
newborn before all pregnancy and birth-related medical care is completed and
explaining why this argument does not justify mandatory IV testing of
newborns).
47 See Connor, supra note 23, at 1173 (stating the findings of the study).
48 See Richardson, supra note 15, at Al (stating that some advocates and
health professionals are now proposing that "[s]uccessfil new drug therapies
make early detection and treatment more important" and that privacy concerns
may now be outweighed by improvements in available treatments).
41 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Revolution in AIDS Drugs Excludes the
Tiniest Patients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1997, at Al. In early 1996, it was found
that three-drug regimens combining older drugs such as AZT, 3TC and ddi with
new drugs calledprotease inhibitors canprolong life and most effectivelycombat
HIV. See id. at Al, A14.
o See id.
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drug regimen more quickly than adults because they are very likely
to miss doses due to vomiting, spitting up or otherwise refusing the
medicine and because doctors are uncertain about the appropriate
dosages for children.5" Moreover, newborns have missed out on
the benefits of new drugs almost entirely because protease
inhibitors, which are drugs that are essential to the triple combi-
nation therapies, have not been approved for children under two
years of age.52
Second, the administration of the new drugs to children may
create serious health risks. As discussed above, doctors are
uncertain about proper drug dosages for children. Administering an
improper dosage of protease inhibitors may have "dire conse-
quences" for the child.53 Moreover, the National Institute of
Health recently reported a study's finding that AZT causes cancer
in baby mice whose mothers are administered AZT during
pregnancy.54 The 7Tmes reported that a study "found high doses
of AZT increased certain types of cancer in baby mice, including
an eight-fold increased risk of lung cancer in males. And 17
percent of the female mice developed rare reproductive tumors, a
" See id. One mother thought that her child was taking the pills religiously,
only to find that the pills were being hidden under a radiator. See id.
52 See id. It is suggested that mandatory testing is justified because patients
benefit the most when the triple combination therapies are administered very
early in the HIV infection, which, for perinatal transmissions, would be just after
birth. However, only some newborns, who are enrolled in clinical trials, have
access to protease inhibitors. See id.
" Id. The New York Times recently reported: "Dosing information for
protease inhibitors is still sketchy in children, both because the drugs have been
studied much more thoroughly in adults and because young people metabolize
them differently. That has left doctors playing a guessing game with potentially
dire consequences. Too much medication could harm a child. Too little could
create a mutant strain of H.I.V., saddling young patients with an illness that
resists future treatment." Id. Dr. Ross McKinney, who specializes in pediatric
AIDS at Duke University Medical Center, says that he only prescribes protease
inhibitors to children "'when we are really up against a wall... using them
broadly is simply to invite disaster."' Id.
" See Panel Urges Caution in Use of AIDS Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15,
1997, at A16.
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type similar to those caused by the drug DES that women once
took to prevent miscarriages.
55
Third, Clinical Trial 076 only determined that HIV transmission
is preventable when AZT is administered throughout the entire
reproductive cycle: to pregnant women before birth and during
birth, and to the newborn postnatally.5 6 This study did not deter-
mine that administering AZT postnatally will decrease the chances
of HIV infection in newborns.5" Therefore, testing of newborns
will show that a mother is HIV-infected and that her infant has
been HIIV-exposed, but the advantages of early detection and early
administration of AZT are lost where there is only post-natal
identification of HIV exposure or infection. 8 Proponents of
mandatory testing therefore misrepresent the capability and risks of
current medical therapies when they insist that testing newborns or
pregnant women will save babies' lives.59
In addition to economic obstacles to health care and the highly
questionable benefits of treatment for HIV-positive infants,
55 Id. After this article appeared in the Times, some advocates issued a press
release claiming that the Pataki administration has failed to appropriately inform
pregnant women of the potential health risks posed by AZT therapy. See Women
Charge Pataki Administration with Concealing Dangers of AZT; Demand
Government Disclosure of Cancer Risk to HIV-Negative Children Posed by AIDS
Treatment During Pregnancy, Press Release, Jan. 23, 1997 (on file with the
Journal of Law and Policy).
56 See Connor, supra note 23, at 1173 (stating that according to Clinical
Trial 076, the effectiveness of AZT depends on administration early in the
pregnancy); HIV Testing and Counselingfor Women: An Update, supra note 43,
at 1050 ("The effectiveness of [AZT] therapy depends on diagnosis of HIV
infection before or during early pregnancy.").
57 See Connor, supra note 23, at 1173.
58 See Richard Goldstein, Spare the Mother, Save the Child: The State Is
Considering a New Policy on HIV Testing that Promotes Prenatal Screening But
Preserves Parental Consent, VILLAGE VOICE, June 7, 1994, at 24 (discussing
what can and cannot be done for infants identified as HIV-exposed). It should
be noted that infants who are seriously ill at birth are generally given appropriate
medical care, whether or not they have been exposed to HIV.
" Dr. McKinney comments that although many adults are experiencing
terrific results from new treatments, "'none of us are perceiving that we are
getting the same results in kids,"' and "'[i]nfected kids are getting left behind."'
Stolberg, supra note 49, at Al, A14.
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mandatory testing creates significant psychological obstacles for
women attempting to access care and treatment. If pregnant women
know they will be forced to get an HIV test, they may turn away
from the health care system and forego prenatal care altogether:
The spread of HIV can be reduced only through the
willingness of individuals to avoid unsafe sexual and
needle-sharing behavior. This introduction of compulsory
screening may have the reverse effect of causing persons
vulnerable to HIV to avoid coming forward for testing,
counseling, and treatment. If the public health strategy is
to encourage as many people as possible to receive
education and counseling, then the use of measures that
can be regarded as controlling or punitive might be
counterproductive.6"
In addition, women who are subjected to coercive testing may be
driven away from seeking medical treatment in the future because
coercive testing creates an environment of distrust and does not
foster necessary cooperative relationships between medical
providers and patients.61
Mandatory testing undermines the positive psychological effects
of pre- and post-test counseling.62 Pre-test counseling can assist an
60 Gostin, supra note 16, at 15. See also Field, supra note 4, at 422-23
(stating that coercive HIV testing harms public health because women will be
driven from prenatal care).
61 Post, supra note 1, at 181-82. Post writes:
Aggressive and sustained counseling for women before and after birth
is widely considered to be the most effective method of getting women
to be tested voluntarily and then securing their cooperation in behavior
modification. Most health care professionals believe that involving
women as active partners, rather than simply informing them of their
HIV serostatus, leads to successful health care management.
Post, supra note 1, at 181-82.
62 Counseling can educate the patient about "the meaning of a positive and
negative test, the known routes of transmission, and [for pregnant women] the
estimated risk of perinatal lIV transmission." Nancy E. Kass, Reproductive
Decision Making in the Context of HIV: The Case for Nondirective Counseling,
in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NExT GENERATION, supra note 46, at 308, 312.
Counseling should also involve discussions of safer-sex practices and the use of
clean needles for intravenous drug users.
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individual in coming to her own decision to be tested and help
prepare the counselee for a positive test result. Post-test counseling
is important even for those who test negative because it can
encourage them to continue safer sex and drug practices and negate
the tendency of the uninfected to assume that they are immune.
When the counselee is HIV-infected, post-test counseling can
provide crucial psychological support and direct the counselee to
further counseling and medical care. This may also include
"determining and facilitating a patient's ability to tap her own
support system and typical coping mechanisms."63
Involuntary testing creates an antagonistic relationship between
medical provider and patient and eliminates the opportunity for
conscious decision-making that cooperative counseling provides.
Under mandatory testing, women, with little or no counseling or
support from health providers, will be forced into an array of social
problems which are best endured only after making a thoughtful
and conscious decision to have an HIV test. The social risks of
being identified as HIV-positive include the loss of employment
and housing, isolation from spouses, friends and family, and
difficulty in obtaining medical insurance." Women are also
subject to an increased risk of domestic violence after testing
positive." Aggressive counseling and voluntary testing of pregnant
63 Kass, supra note 62, at 312. If a decision must be made about terminating
or initiating pregnancy, "it is crucial to sort out the counselee's values and
feelings in regard to the decision." Kass, supra note 62, at 312. See generally
CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing counseling and testing strategies
and objectives).
6 See Post, supra note 1, at 179 n.67. In addition, health care professionals
have refused to treat HIV-infected individuals, employers try to fire HIV-infected
employees and some have advocated for the quarantine of infected persons. See
Peter H. Berge, Setting Limits on Involuntary HIV Antibody Testing Under Rule
35 and State Independent Medical Examination Statutes, 44 FLA. L. REv. 767,
780-81 (1992). Current protections from these kinds of discrimination are
inadequate. See Banks, supra note 21, at 370-71 (discussing the social and
economic stigma of identified HIV infection).
65 See Karen L. Goldstein, Note, Balancing Risks and Rights: HIV Testing
Regimes for Pregnant Women, 4 CoRNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 609, 620 (1995).
Unfortunately, the 1996 amendments to the Ryan White CARE Act also include
a provision that requires all states to make a "good faith effort to notify the
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women is therefore the more effective policy choice because it will
more wholly suit the health needs of HIV-infected women.66
The emotional health of women may be even more seriously
threatened by mandatory testing of newborns. If a newborn tests
positive for HIV antibodies it is automatically known that the
mother is HIV-positive.6" Therefore, administering an IlV test to
a newborn without the mother's consent has a similar effect on the
mother as does the forcible administration of an HIV test to a
pregnant woman. However, the adverse psychological effect on the
mother may be heightened because she may be suffering from
postpartum depression68 and is certainly adapting to her new life
spouse of a known HI V-infected patient that such spouse may have been exposed
to [IRV] and should seek testing." 42 U.S.C. § 300ff-27a. If an informed spouse
or partner perceives that a woman is IHV-positive because of sexual infidelity
or drug use, a woman may face the risk of physical violence and loss of
economic support for herself and her children. See Post, supra note 1, at 197
n.179.
66 See generally CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 1 (recommending
aggressive strategies of counseling and voluntary testing for pregnant women and
rejecting mandatory HIV testing initiatives).
617 See HIV Infection, Pregnant Women, and Newborns: A Policy Proposal
for Information and Testing, 264 JAMA 2416 (1991). Many infants born to HIV-
infected mothers will test positive for HIV antibodies, which they have acquired
from the mother. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 7. This positive
antibody test shows that the newborn has been exposed to I-V, but does not
mean that the newborn is infected with HIV. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12,
at 7. Using only the ELISA test, which is the most widely used and inexpensive
HIV test in this country, laboratories cannot determine that an infant is infected
with HIV until around 18 months of age, when the infant's system is cleared of
all maternal antibodies. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 7. The relatively
new and much more expensive PCR test can more definitively identify the virus
in infants shortly after birth. See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 7.
68 Postpartum depression occurs in 8 to 20% of women after birth. See Lori
A. Button, Comment, Postpartum Psychosis: The Birth of a New Defense?, 6
T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 323, 324 (1989). The symptoms of this moderate to
extreme depression can include mood swings, delusions, suicidal ideation, lack
of concentration, insomnia, psychotic episodes, panic attacks and negative
feelings toward the infant. See AMEIcAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsoRDERs 386-87 (4th ed.
1994). Fifty to eighty percent of women experience a more temporary and less
severe postpartum disorder, known as maternity blues or baby blues, which is
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as a mother. In addition, the new mother will be less able to keep
the HIV infection a private matter as she struggles to cope with this
news. One attorney, who represents low-income women infected
with IIV, recalls asking her clients how they would have
responded had they learned of their HIV status after birth pursuant
to a mandatory testing of newborns scheme.6 9 "[O]ne replied that
she might have killed herself. Others said they would never have
returned to the hospital for fear that their children would be taken
away., 70 Thus, the concern that coercive HIV testing will drive
women from care is also present when the newborn, and not the
pregnant woman, is mandatorily tested for HV.
Driving women from health care hurts infants and mothers.
Infants do not obtain medical treatment on their own. If mothers
are alienated from the health care system, their children, likewise,
will not receive the medical care they need.7 Thus, proponents of
characterizedby tearfulness, insomnia, anxiety and mild depression. See Button,
supra, at 324.
69 McGovern, supra note 39, at 33.
70 McGovern, supra note 39, at 33.
7' Dr. Michael T. Mennuti, the Chairman of the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists's Committee on Obstetric Practice, states that
when "'HIV testing is mandatory in an office or clinic setting, individuals simply
stop going to that physician or clinic."' Kent, supra note 27, at 1 (quoting Dr.
Mennuti). "'This was highlighted most recently in New York, where women with
HIV stated that they would not seek care from physicians who required HIV
testing at prenatal care clinics. Unfortunately, the stigma attached to HIV in
certain communities still precludes many women from seeking out their HIV
status."' Kent, supra note 27, at 1 (quoting Dr. Mennuti). Discussing similar
problems with mandatory HIV testing, Dr. Robert J. Simonds writes:
Prenatal care, treatment for HIV infection, and zidovudine treatment
to reduce perinatal transmission all require frequent interactions and an
ongoing collaborativerelationship between an HIV-infectedwoman and
her health care professional. Mandatory testing programs may
jeopardize these interactions and this relationship. Some women fear
HIV testing because they are unprepared to face their test results or are
concerned about lack of confidentiality, stigmatization, or other
negative consequences of being diagnosed with HIV infection. If
prenatal testing is mandatory, some women may not seek prenatal care
to avoid being tested or not continue prenatal care to avoid receiving
test results, thus missing opportunities not only for preventing perinatal
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mandatory testing cannot honestly argue that infants do not suffer
from coercive testing policies or that infants can only gain attention
and care under mandatory testing policies.
Proponents also argue that forced testing leads to behavioral
changes which benefit both the woman and the fetus. 2 Their
position is that HBI-infected pregnant women who know of their
lIV status will seek medical treatment and counseling, make
changes in sexual practices and drug use, alter their general
personal health choices,73 and maybe decide not to become
pregnant or to terminate a pregnancy. 4 This reasoning is flawed
because there is no evidence that a person will "make more rational
decisions about behavior change if [she] is informed about [her]
serological status,"75 especially when frightening information
about HLV-infection is unexpectedly thrust upon an individual who
has not even consented to a test.
For example, there are many reasons why an HIV-infected
woman might decide to bear a child. "Many women may feel
pressure from the great value society places upon women to
reproduce, and may feel that bearing a child can improve their
community status. Some commentators have observed that this
transmission but also for receiving other benefits of prenatal care.
Furthermore, testing against their patients' wishes would transform
clinicians from advocates for their patients to enforcers of legal
mandates. The supportive environment needed to successfully initiate
and maintain prenatal and HIV care likely would be compromised
when the patient-physician relationship begins under the threat of such
measures.
Robert J. Simonds et al., PreventingPerinatalHIV Transmission, 276 JAMA 779
(1996) (letter to the editor).
72 See McKenna, supra note 15, at 147 (stating that "becauseknowledge can
actually make a difference in a pregnant woman's choices and behavior, she has
a right, and an obligation, to know if she is infected").
71 See McKenna, supra note 15, at 147.
74 See Grizzi, supra note 20, at 484.
7' Gostin, supra note 16, at 15. In other contexts it is acknowledged that
individuals do not necessarily change their behavior simply because they have
medical information concerning the potential detrimental effects of certain
practices, such as cigarette smoking.
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pressure may be especially strong in minority cultures. '" 6 In
addition, women who are chemically dependent may experience
motherhood as a boost to their self-esteem; others may want to
leave behind a legacy; still others may be in denial about their
condition or may actually be very healthy.Y There is also no
obvious answer to the question of whether it is ethical for women
who know they are HIV-infected to choose to bear children: fewer
than 8.3% of infants born to HIV-infected mothers will actually be
HIV-infected if the mother is administered AZT, and fewer than
25.5% of infants born without AZT therapy will be infected.7"
Thus, proponents have failed to show how mandatory testing leads
to behavioral changes which benefit the women and fetus. To the
contrary, coercive and unexpected HIV testing may result in greater
stress and psychological damage to a pregnant woman or a new
mother who learns of her HIV infection in this manner.79
In addition, it should not be assumed that mandatory testing
will necessarily result in HIV-infected women and children taking
AZT. Infected women and children may lack access to drug
treatments.80 Furthermore, HIV-infected women may choose not
to engage in a program of AZT therapy and decline to place their
children on AZT Many HIV-infected individuals have made a
reasoned and educated decision not to take AZT because of its high
levels of toxicity, its side effects and unknown dangers." Because
76 Grizzi, supra note 20, at 485.
77 See Grizzi, supra note 20, at 485-86.
78 See Connor, supra note 23, at 1176. See also HIV, AIDS AND
CHILDBEARING (Ruth R. Faden & Nancy E. Kass eds., 1996) (challenging the
assumption that HIV-positive women should not have children).
79 See Gostin, supra note 16, at 15.
8" See Richardson, supra note 45, § 1, at 25 (noting that Black and Hispanic
populations in New York City do not have the same access to AIDS treatments
that Whites do, despite the fact that HIV infection is growing in the Black and
Hispanic communities).
"1 The CDC notes that although Clinical Trial 076 indicated that AZT
therapy can have substantial benefits for the infants of HV-infected pregnant
women, the trial also presented a few unresolved issues. See CDC Guidelines,
supra note 12, at 4. These issues include questions about the long-term safety of
AZT for mothers and infants, the effectiveness of AZT for women who have
different clinical characteristics than trial participants and the probability of
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the long-term effects of AZT on mothers, fetuses and infants are
unknown, a childbearing woman's decision to refuse AZT therapy
should be respected. 2
Finally, mandatory testing proponents make assumptions about
behavior and lifestyle which are ignorant of race, class and gender
difference. Knowledge of HIV status may affect poor women and
women of color differently than it affects, for instance, middle-class
white men. For the middle-class white man, becoming H1V-positive
may be the ultimate crisis of his life. For women who have
suffered from poverty and racism throughout their lives, HIV
infection may be just one more obstacle to overcome. While the
middle-class white man will likely be able to invest in extensive
counseling, support groups, medical care and dietary programs,
low-income women have overwhelming economic and social
barriers to overcome, in addition to psychological barriers. Because
so many additional obstacles have already been placed in the way
of low-income women and women of color, it is simply outrageous
to drive the women most at risk for HIV away from care with
coercive policies which are justified on grounds that are irrelevant
to their lives.8 3 Women need cooperation and understanding in
individuals' adherenceto strict regimens for the administration of AZT. See CDC
Guidelines, supra note 12, at 4.
2 See CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 4, 10. The CDC states:
The PHS recommendations for [AZT] therapy emphasize that HIV-
infected pregnant women should be informed of both benefits and
potential risks when making decisions to receive [AZT] therapy.
Discussions of treatment options should be noncoercive-the final
decision to accept or reject [AZT] treatment is the responsibility of the
woman. Decisions concerning treatment can be complex and adherence
to therapy, if accepted, can be difficult; therefore, good rapport and a
trusting relationship should be established between the health-care
provider and the HIV-infected woman.
CDC Guidelines, supra note 12, at 4.
83 Judith Figueroa, a clinic administrator at St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital
Center in Manhattan, states: "'Mandatory testing is not the way to go. I feel that
there has to be another creative way of distributing this information. Because
you're going to drive these women underground. You really are."' John Riley,
Focus On: Mandatory AIDS Tests: Pain of Knowing: Doctor, Clinician Disagree
on Testing Moms, Newborns, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 25, 1993, at 15 (quoting
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order to cope with this virus, not paternalistic health and social
policies.
A policy of aggressive HIV counseling and voluntary HIV
testing of pregnant women will more adequately address the
interests of women and infants than will mandatory testing. 4
Rather than spending federal and state funds on mandatory testing,
federal and state governments should be funding programs which
educate the public about HIV transmission, bring pregnant women
into care and provide free counseling and medical care to infected
individuals.8 5  Programs that combine mandatory, aggressive
Judith Figueroa). Figueroa, who counsels women at risk for HIV before and after
they give birth, "sees the panic that testing can arouse among the largely poor
and minority women who use St. Luke's." Id.
Anna Quindlen writes:
The idea that a woman, postpartum, would forge ahead heroically
after being informed that her kid may be mortally ill and she herself
is a goner would make for a swell television movie. But it is not, says
Dr. Mitchell [who runs a clinic at Harlem Hospital], real life.
Real life is talking to her patients at every visit about H.I.V.
testing, just as she talks about nutrition and smoking and drugs. It is
explaining to them what being positive would mean and what kind of
help is available to them and their babies. It is follow-up, outreach and
persistence.
And it works. Close to 90 percent of the women in the Harlem
Hospital program agree to be tested, and nearly all infected babies are
in care. "We create trust," Dr. Mitchell says. "You cannot tell someone
that they are H.I.V. positive out of a clear blue sky."
Quindlen, supra note 39, at A25.
5 Some analysts have determined that it is more cost-effective to perform
counseling and voluntary testing than it is to conduct mandatory testing. See
Gostin, supra note 16, at 14-16. Gostin states:
The personal and economic costs engendered by a program of
compulsory screening are likely to be disproportionate to the marginal
public health benefit. The objective of a screening is to obtain shifts in
behavior and early treatment among groups most vulnerable to HIV
infection. This objective can be achieved in a more effective and less
restrictive way through a comprehensive, voluntary program of public
health education and professional testing and counseling services.
Those inclined to seek treatment and behavior control are likely to
respond to cost-free, readily available education and services. Such a
voluntary program would achieve the same public health advantages as
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counseling and voluntary testing of pregnant women are the more
effective alternative to policies of mandatory testing.
Despite the huge success of Harlem Hospital's aggressive
counseling program, which resulted in almost 90% of women
volunteering for an HIV test after being counseled about I-I, 6
states have made little effort to really attempt counseling and
voluntary testing programs. Terry McGovern, Legal Director of the
HIV Law Project, states that many women she has spoken with
"were never offered counseling and testing."8 Some dismiss
voluntary testing programs on the assumption that "women will
refuse to be tested voluntarily, even after they have been informed
of the risks and benefits HIV testing holds for them and their
children."8 Others minimize Harlem Hospital's high success rate
with voluntary testing initiatives by portraying it as truly excep-
tional and impossible to duplicate.89 What mandatory testing
proponents fail to realize is that even with mandatory testing,
adequate pre- and post-test counseling must still be performed, and
it is not more cost-effective to institute mandatory testing than it is
a mandatory program without the significant detriments of the
widespread use of compulsion.
Gostin, supra note 16, at 16. One study has concluded that programs involving
counseling and voluntary testing of pregnant women and subsequent AZT
treatment for those identified as HIV-infected reduce the overall costs of
pediatric AIDS cases. See Gorsky, supra note 21, at 335 (calculating "the annual
cost of HIV counseling and voluntary testing for pregnant women and the cost
of [AZT] treatment for HIV-infected women and their infants" and finding that
this intervention saved costs in medical care because of the resulting decrease in
pediatric HIV infections).
86 See Quindlen, supra note 39, at A25.
s7 McGovern, supra note 39, at 33.
88 Post, supra note 1, at 197 ("Implicit [in mandatory testing initiatives] is
the notion that coercion is the only way to get women to do what is in their
children's best interest. This assumption . . . has been explicitly rejected by
maternal and pediatric health care professionals."). See also Simonds, supra note
71, at 779 (arguing that an "often unspoken tenet of arguments and policies
favoring mandatory prenatal HIV testing is that many women will not be tested
if testing is voluntary").
89 See Goldstein, supra note 65, at 622 (stating that proponents "suggest that
[Harlem Hospital's] long-established, flexible program is incompatible with the
more administratively-oriented environment of conventional hospitals").
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to counsel women affected by I1V90 Proponents of mandatory
testing have rejected the approach of aggressive counseling and
voluntary testing before it has even been attempted in a large-scale
initiative. 9 Instead, they punish and blame women for the failure
of government and health providers to aggressively counsel
pregnant women about HIV tests. 9
2
The federal action taken in the amendments to the Ryan White
CARE Act has granted opponents of mandatory testing some time
to continue fighting this issue on the state level. 93 During this
crucial time, opponents of mandatory testing need to re-frame the
debate by focusing not on the respective rights of women and
fetuses, but on the public health reasons which support voluntary
and confidential pre- and post-natal care, and on exposing the
problematic assumptions behind mandatory HIV testing laws.
III. RIGHTS TALK IN THE MANDATORY TESTING DEBATE
Unfortunately, the public debate around mandatory testing has
not done justice to these complex issues. While opponents have
made great attempts to show that mandatory testing is harmful to
families and a destructive public health policy,94 proponents have
90 See supra note 85 (citing studies of the cost-effectiveness of mandatory
testing).
91 See Shelton, supra note 21, at 23 (quoting McGovern).
92 See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text (discussing the ways that
women affected by HIV have been abandoned throughout the history of the
AIDS epidemic).
93 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text (discussing the 1996
amendments to the Ryan White CARE Act).94From discussions with lawyers working to oppose mandatorytesting, I have
learned that opponents have made enormous efforts to take the public discussion
of this issue away from rights-centered rhetoric. This is also evident from many
articles that oppose mandatory testing on public policy grounds and do not rely
solely on rights arguments. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Cooper, Why Mandatory HIV
Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns Must Fail: A Legal, Historical and
Public Policy Analysis, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 13, 22-26 (1996); Field,
supra note 4; Theresa M. McGovern, Mandatory HIV Testing and Treating of
Child-Bearing Women: An Unnatural, Illegal, and Unsound Approach, 28
CoLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 469 (1997). Although proponents assert that
opponents are only concerned about women's rights, most opponents detail the
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very effectively constructed this issue as one that involves women's
and children's rights. This is both a testament to proponents'
political savvy and to the predominance of rights ideology in our
culture. Within the public sphere, there is little discussion about the
actual impact of mandatory testing on HIV-infected women and
children. The public health and social problems involved are
publicly presented as a more simple question: are the rights of a
woman or the rights of the fetus and infant paramount? This focus
reflects a cultural preoccupation with evaluating the relative rights
of women and infants, which, for example, is also articulated in
public debates about abortion and fetal endangerment prosecu-
tions."
The purpose of this section is not to analyze whose rights are
legally paramount, or which rights are protected or guaranteed by
law.96 Rather, it seeks to illuminate how the debate around
deleterious effects of mandatory testing on women and children and assert rights
arguments only as part of a legal analysis. Therefore, rather than arguing that
opponents have placed the focus on rights, I want to show that rights claims in
the public debate tend to overshadow more complicated, substantive contentions
concerning the problems of mandatory testing. My project also is to illustrate
how rights discourse has to a large extent produced and determined the terms of
the mandatory testing debate so that arguments against mandatory testing are
made more difficult. I would even contend that rights and individualist ideology
provide the context for the development of mandatory testing policies.
" See supra note 11 (noting the plethora of recent news stories about fetal
endangerment prosecutions and mothers suspected of murdering their infants).
96 Several authors have explored whether mandatory testing violates
constitutional and statutory rights. See, e.g., Colin Crawford, An Argument for
Universal Pediatric HIV Testing, Counseling and Treatment, 3 CARDOZO
WoMEN's L.J. 31, 40 (1996) (arguing that state interest in protecting public
health, especially in light of the increasing availability of effective new
treatments, may override constitutional concerns); Field, supra note 4, at 411-13
(arguing that mandatory testing violates the 14th Amendment's protection of
women's privacy); Grizzi, supra note 20, at 484-500 (discussing the extent of a
mother's right to refuse medical treatment); McKenna, supra note 15, at 133
(arguing that pregnant women have a right to refuse medical intervention); Post,
supra note 1, at 226 (evaluating a proposed mandatory testing scheme in New
York, which later became law in modified form, and concluding that the
proposed law carried "the potential for significant infringement of a woman's
constitutionally protected rights").
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mandatory testing is one in which a colloquial and popular notion
of "rights" is deployed, in addition to legal notions of rights, in
order to support each of the opposing positions.97
The mandatory testing issue is framed as one that pits fetal and
children's rights against women's rights, or welfare of the child
against women's rights.98 Both proponents and opponents of
mandatory testing use the language of rights to legitimate their
arguments and appeal to common sense. Although opponents have
sought to show how this issue is about families and public health
policy, the public has focused primarily on opponents' legal
arguments that mandatory testing violates constitutional and
statutory rights of women, especially privacy, equal protection and
procreative rights and patients' rights under informed consent
laws. 99 The constitutional right to privacy that is asserted in
9' Section IV discusses the way that this focus on rights has precluded the
pursuit of more holistic and less oppositional approaches to the issue and
questions the efficacy of using rights rhetoric to oppose mandatory testing.
" See Paris R. Baldacci, An Introduction to "Mandatory HIV Screening of
Newborns: A Child's Welfare in Conflict with its Mother's Constitutional
Rights? " - False Dichotomies Make Bad Law, 3 CARDOZO WoMEN's L.J. 1, 5
(1996). Professor Baldacci of Cardozo School of Law states:
discussion of the legal, political, medical, and public health policy
implications of recent medical developments regarding HIV treatment
of newborns is, indeed, all too frequently articulated in terms of a
necessary and inevitable conflict between the child's medical welfare
and his or her mother's constitutional rights of privacy and autonomous
informed choice regarding medical testing and treatment.
Id. at 5. See also Navarro, supra note 14, at Al ("A growing effort in New York
State to identify and quickly treat children infected with H.I.V. has led to a
struggle over how to reconcile the health needs of the children with the right to
privacy of their mothers."); Post, supra note 1, at 170-71 ("Because it involves
the health of newborns and the rights of women, this issue predictably has come
to be framed in terms of maternal-child rights."); Riley, supra note 83, at 15
(stating that the mandatory HV testing debate "ultimately pits the health of the
babies against the rights of their mothers").
99 See supra note 96 (citing law review articles addressing the legal rights
implicated by mandatory testing); Kathryn Boockvar, Beyond Survival: The
Procreative Rights of Women with HIV, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4, 21-41
(1994) (arguing that women should not be "screened, prosecuted, or punished for
perinatal transfer of HIV" because such initiatives "violate women's constitu-
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opponents' legal arguments derives primarily from the Supreme
Court cases Griswold v. Connecticut,'00 Eisenstadt v. Baird'"°
and Roe v. Wade.' °2 Opponents also derive from these constitu-
tional privacy rights less legalistic and more popular and colloquial
"rights." For instance, one author has written of a woman's "right
not to know" about her HIV infection, 0 3 "right of personal
autonomy,"'' "right to develop ... individuality"'10 5 and "right
to make her own medical decisions,"' 6 and questioned whether
there is a "right to object even to learning the truth. °10 7 Thus,
when making legal arguments, opponents of mandatory testing
attest to rights that are grounded both in constitutional doctrine and
a derivative, popular rhetoric of rights.
tional rights of liberty and privacy" and "work against sensible public policies
rather than accomplishing legitimate state goals"); Julie D. Levinson, Note, While
Ignorance May Not Be Bliss, It Is a Mother's Right: Constitutional Implications
of Testing Newborn Babies for HIV, 3 CARDOZO WoMEN's L.J. 71 (1996)
(arguing that mandatory HIV testing violates women's rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and privacy and procreative
rights); Catherine H. McCabe, Ryan White CARE Amendments: Mandatory HIV
Testing of Newborns and a Woman's Right to Privacy, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 373 (1996) (arguing that the 1996 amendments to the Ryan White Care
Act, if applied by the states in mandatory testing schemes, violate women's
constitutional right of privacy); Post, supra note 1, at 199-226 (arguing that the
state must choose public health measures that will infringe on individual rights
as little as possible and that mandatory testing measures violate women's
constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection); Sangree, supra note 18, at
316, 362-441 (demonstrating how the "coercive'control over childbearing and
HIV testing infringes upon various basic individual rights").
'0o 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a right to marital privacy as falling
within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights).
'' 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (employing equal protection doctrine to expand
Griswold's right to privacy to include individual procreative privacy rights).
102 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive due process doctrine requires that the right of personal privacy
include a woman's right to have an abortion).
103 Field, supra note 4, at 411.
"o Field, supra note 4, at 412.
'05 Field, supra note 4, at 412.
lO Field, supra note 4, at 412.
107 Field, supra note 4, at 409.
218
RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Proponents also offer legalistic rights arguments. It is argued
that when there is no mandatory testing requirement, fetal and
children's rights are violated." 8 Another tactic of proponents is
to argue that mandatory testing protects women's rights because a
mother has a "right to know" that she and her infant are infected
and that mothers will in fact gain new rights under mandatory
testing laws.0 9
Proponents utilize a popular notion of rights to bolster their
arguments, much more so than opponents of mandatory testing.
"' Dr. Keith Krasinski of Bellevue Hospital states: "'Every child must be
identified for HIV at birth so that he or she can be treated. To do less is
discrimination in its cruelest form."' Hentoff, supra note 6, at 8 (quoting Dr.
Krasinski). Gretchen Buchenholz, Director of the Association to Benefit
Children, argues that the failure to mandatorily test infants violates infants'
constitutional ights:
[The state] is obligated to perform and disclose results of HIV tests so
appropriate treatment may be provided. Failure to do so violates the
U.S. and New York constitutions' equal protection clauses, and the
state's constitutional obligation to care for the needy. This sacrifice of
defenseless children on the altar of political expediency and special
interests can no longer be tolerated.
Buchenholz, supra note 8, at 37. Buchenholz wrote another article in the New
York Daily News concerning infants' '"rights" to HIV identification that was
entitled HIV Babies Have Rights, Too. Buchenholz, supra note 7, at 15C.
'
09See Hentoff, supra note 6, at 8 (discussing remarks by Dr. Arthur
Ammann, Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Southern California). Juliet
McKenna writes: "Mandatory testing [of pregnant women] is warranted by a
woman's own right to be aware of her HIV status, apart from any interest that
may be asserted on behalf of the fetus or the public health." McKenna, supra
note 15, at 134.
An article announcing Pataki's regulations for the testing of all newborns
was entitled New Rights for Moms in HIV Tests. Tayler, supra note 9, at A4. In
describing the former New York screening program in which all infants were
anonymously screened for HIV for epidemiological purposes, the New York
Times wrote that parents could not learn of the results. See Hernandez, Pataki's
Plan to Offer Results of HI. V Tests is Assailed, supra note 39, at B2. This
characterization of the screening program implies that parents were somehow
cheated of their right to know their child's HIV status, even though parental
knowledge of HIV infection was not the purpose of the blinded screening and
even though any parent can always volunteer for an HIV test or request that their
child be tested.
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Proponents mock women's rights by arguing that a mother does not
have a "right to remain ignorant."' 0 In addition, some proponents
irresponsibly attempt to harness conservative distaste for civil
libertarians, feminists and gay rights advocates by claiming that it
is primarily these groups that motivate opposition to mandatory
testing.'
Members of Congress also debated the clashing rights of
women and infants when they considered the amendments to the
Ryan White CARE Act. Representative Gary Ackerman [D-N.Y],
an advocate of mandatory HIV testing for newborns in cases where
the mother has not been tested for BIll stated in a floor debate:
Some have advocated that the mother has a right to
privacy, and in testing the child we have inadvertently or
deliberately tested the mother to determine her status, and
that the mother has a right to remain ignorant of her status
if she so chooses. That may be so, but the child has a right
to live.
In this complex and complicated society, so often rights
conflict. . . . Certainly if the right of the child to survive
is more important than the constitutional right of freedom
110 See infra note 112 and accompanying text (remarks of Rep. Ackerman).
I For example, in referring to New York's mandatory testing debate,
proponent Nat Hentoff writes: "'The parents and kids are pawns in somebody
else's game.' And that game is financed by these groups with money for
lobbyists in Albany while the most at-risk black, Latina, and white kids are
without such resources." Hentoff, supra note 6, at 8 (quoting Dr. Stephen
Nicholas, the medical director of a residential program for children with AIDS).
Hentoff describes these wealthy interests as the Gay Men's Health Crisis, the
ACLU, and "some feminists and medical societies." Hentoff, supra note 6, at 8.
By characterizing opponents of mandatory testing as only civil libertarians
and feminists, Hentoff ignores that many of mandatory testing's fiercest
opponents are also not-for-profit AIDS service providers, who for many years
have advocated for and represented the communities who will be most impacted
by mandatory testing. HIV Law Project, which provides free legal services to
low-income individuals with HIV and AIDS, Housing Works, which also assists
low-income people living with HIV, and approximately 30 other organizations
and individual women filed an action in New York to attack Pataki's mandatory
testing regulations. See Attorney General Vacco Agrees to Violate Existing State
Law to Mandate HIV Testing of All Women Giving Birth, supra note 39.
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of religion, certainly it is equally important as the mother's
right to remain ignorant."2
Representative Patsy Mink [D-Haw.] responded: "I question
whether or not we can accomplish [reduced incidences of vertical
transmission of HIV] by simply mandating testing. Mandatory
testing violates the civil liberties of the woman and may produce
the opposite response by driving them out of medical care.""' 3
Proponents of mandatory testing successfully minimized
opponents' focus on public health and families and pushed rights-
based analysis to the forefront. In the Congressional forum as well
as in public speech, the mandatory testing debate is constructed as
an argument about whose rights are paramount. The following
section argues that contemporary rights discourse by its nature
overshadows attempts to address substantive policy issues and fails
to foster a discursive and political environment conducive to the
creation of policy that can help prevent perinatal HIV transmission
and enable access to care for women and children.
V RIGHTS DISCOURSE, INDIVIDUALISM AND OPPOSITION
The discourse of rights" 4 obscures the intricacies of manda-
tory testing, eliminates consideration of how women and their
112 141 Cong. Rec. H9050-05, H9059-60 (1995).
13 Id. at H9061.
114 Rights discourse has been critiqued by Critical Legal Studies ("CLS")
texts. See generally Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36
STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (engaging in a now infamous dialogue about the
difficulties with critique of rights and other CLS polemics); Mark Tushnet, The
Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REv. 23 (1993) (outlining the problems with
rights discourses). Others have also articulated a critique of rights. See generally
MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE xi, xii (1991) (arguing that "our distinctive current rights dialect...
frequently works against the conditions required for the pursuit of dignified
living" and advocating for a renewal of "our strong rights tradition"); LEGAL
RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1996) (providing a collection of essays on rights from
varied perspectives); Matthew A. Ritter, "Human Rights": Would You Recognize
One If You Saw One? A Philosophical Hearing of International Rights Talk, 27
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 265 (1997) (discussing rights in the international context).
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children are actually affected by mandatory testing and conceals the
failure of government and the community to adequately address the
needs of women and children affected by HIV" 5 Instead of
enabling the community to confront the particular problems that
women face in terms of access to prevention services, education,
counseling and medical care, rights discourses focus the public's
attention on abstract notions and rhetoric" 6 and construct an
opposition between women and their children. Conferring a right
becomes an end in itself. 7 Rights rhetoric creates the impression
115 See infra notes 146-55 and accompanyingtext (providing some examples
of how women, especially low-income women and women of color, have been
abandoned by government and health care providers throughout the AIDS
epidemic).
16 Some CLS theorists attack rights on the grounds that they are illusory,
vacuous diversions which prevent government, lawyers and the public from
seriously analyzing the issues at hand. See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114,
at 33-34. CLS theorist Peter Gabel states:
Exactly what people don't need is their rights. What they need are the
actual forms of social life that have to be created through the building
of movements that can overcome illusions about the nature of what is
political, like the illusion that there is an entity called the state, that
people possess rights. It may be necessary to use the rights argument
in the course of political struggle, in order to make gains. But the thing
to be understood is the extent to which it is enervating to use it. It's
a diversion from true political language, political modes of communi-
cation about the nature of reality and what it is that people are trying
to achieve ....
Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114, at 33.
117 See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114, at 39. CLS theorist Duncan
Kennedy illustrates this point with a hypothetical situation where a progressive
group wants to picket inside a shopping center, but the police tell them they have
no right to picket. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114, at 27. If the issue is
litigated in court, the progressives will argue that the shopping center is partly
public property, and therefore there is a First Amendment right to picket inside.
Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114, at 27. Kennedy goes on to say: "The problem
with rights analysis [is that it] leads you to believe in the power of saying things
like: 'Well, the shopping center is private property.' It leads you to think that
you've said something when you say that the shopping center is private property.
It's mainly a problem of vacuity." Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114, at 39.
Gabel says that this does not mean that such a case should not be litigated;
rather, "you keep your eye on power and not on rights." Gabel & Kennedy,
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that the mandatory testing issue will be solved once we determine
whose rights are more important."'
supra note 114, at 36. Rights are a diversion because, according to Gabel, they
are merely "shared, imaginary attributes that the group attributes to its members
that don't in fact exist. It's a hallucination." Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114,
at 34.
11 The CLS critique of rights reflects a broader CLS critique of law. One
of the primary contentions of CLS is that law depoliticizes and removes "crucial
issues from the public agenda." THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRITIQUE 5 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990). The law is able to appear as free
from political motivation and value judgments because it is "depicted as separate
from-and 'above'-politics, economics, culture, and the values or preferences
of judges." Id. at 1. See also HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE,
TEXTBOOK ON JURISPRUDENCE 223 (1993) (explaining that under the CLS
approach, contract law, for instance, "serves the ideological function of
reinforcing the conception that law is neutral, self-contained, that it cannot be
challenged and that it is the product of reasoned analysis"). Deconstruction and
CLS teach that, in fact, law is both constitutive of and constructed by society and
is not separable from the "social totality." THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 6
("[T]he law is not simply an armed receptacle for values and priorities
determined elsewhere; it is part of a complex social totality in which it
constitutes as well as is constituted, shapes as well as is shaped.").
Where society presumes that law is objective, CLS "has traditionally aspired
to show how legal orders systematically reflect, generate, and/or reinforce
poverty, class inequality, and patriarchal, homophobic, and racial domination."
Karl E. Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW, supra, at 61, 65. For Roberto Unger, who has written some of the seminal
CLS texts, "legal adjudication is purely arbitrary and used for political purposes
to further the needs of the powerful and persuasive in society." McCOUBREY &
WHITE, supra, at 226. Rand Rosenblatt illustrates this concept with the problem
of welfare rights:
[The] denial of governmental, and more generally social responsibility
with respect to poverty and other human needs, like the similar denial
of responsibility for racism and its effects... enhances the economic
power of the relatively well-off, preserves the myth that the market
operates fairly, neutrally, and apolitically, and reinforces the idea that
those who do not succeed economically have no moral or legal claims
on the community and only themselves to blame.
Rand E. Rosenblatt, Social Duties and the Problem of Rights in the American
Welfare State, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra, at 90, 92.
Rights, because of their self-referential and abstract qualities, serve to
distract attention away from the politicized nature of the law and the economic
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This section examines the effects that rights discourses have on
the mandatory testing debate: how the popular conception and use
of rights diminish the potency of asserting a right; how assertions
of fetal rights are used to usurp the rights of women; how rights
reproduce individualistic ideologies which compel the opposition
between woman, child and fetus and place blame on women for
larger societal problems; and how rights conceal the discriminatory
and racist impetus behind mandatory testing policies. This section
concludes that rights discourse does not positively inform the
debate on whether mandatory testing is effective public health
policy and beneficial for women and children. Those who oppose
mandatory testing should continue trying to shift the focus from
rights and expose mandatory testing as a policy which does not
truly assist women and children affected by HIV and AIDS and
masks government's ongoing failure to appropriately address the
needs of affected women and children.
A. The Changing Landscape of Rights: Rights in Popular
Culture; Counter-Rights; Privacy Rights
The prevalence of rights talk in our popular and political culture
has enabled and legitimized the utilization of fetal and children's
rights as a counter to assertions of women's rights. Contemporary
culture conflates wants and needs with rights; when we feel we
have identified something that we deserve, we use the language of
rights.' 9 In commenting on the proliferation of rights talk,
and social consequences of conferring rights themselves. For instance, in the
mandatory testing debate, it is presumed that determining who has the greater
right, woman or child, will solve the question of whether mandatory testing is
an acceptable and effective policy. The preoccupation with rights forecloses the
possibility of confronting the actual or potential impact of mandatory testing on
women and children and then determining whether it is acceptable policy.
119 See David Ray Papke, Understanding "Rights" in Contemporary
American Discourse, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 521 (1997) (reviewing LEGAL
RIGHTS: HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 114);
Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Needs: The Myth of Disjunction, in LEGAL RIGHTS:
HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 114, at 87
(exploring the relationship between the language of rights and the language of
needs).
224
RIGHTS DISCOURSE
Professor David Ray Papke 2° alludes to a recent hit song,
Passionate Kisses, where the singer demands passionate kisses and
states, "Give me what I deserve because it's my right."
12
'
Another interesting example of popular rights talk is a satiric
moment in the movie Scream 22 when a reporter asks actress
Neve Campbell, "So how does it feel to be almost brutally
butchered? People want to know-they have a right to know.'
' 23
Not only do we commonly express our desires and needs with the
language of rights, but there is also a "tendency to frame nearly
every social controversy in terms of a clash of rights," which
"impedes compromise, mutual understanding, and the discovery of
common ground."'' In the political context, this clash of rights
is exemplified by the mandatory HIIV testing debate and other
issues where women's rights are countered with the rights of
children and fetuses.
One effect of the proliferation of rights talk in popular
discourse is that the effect of asserting a right has been dissi-
pated.125 Although those who historically have been subordinated,
such as certain racial and ethnic groups, women and gays and
lesbians, have used rights discourse progressively in the twentieth
century to strip away the forms and instruments of their subordi-
nation, or in the popularly preferred terms, to achieve greater
"equality," the rhetoric of rights is now employed by those groups
who have enjoyed the privilege of dominance for many
centuries. 1 26 In fact, it has been suggested that the rhetoric of rights
120 Professor of Law and the Liberal Arts, Indiana University at Indianapolis.
121 MARY-CHAPiN CARPENTER, Passionate Kisses, on COME ON COME ON
(Columbia Records 1992). See Papke, supra note 119, at 521.
122 SCREAM (Dimension Films 1996).
123 id.
124 Glendon, supra note 114, at xi (using the example of "a woman's right
to her own body vs. a fetus's right to life"). Professor Mary Ann Glendon notes
that "the catalog of individual liberties expands without much consideration of
the ends to which they are oriented, their relationship to one another, to corre-
sponding responsibilities, or to the general welfare." Glendon, supra note 114,
at xi.
125 See Tuslnet, supra note 114, at 32 (arguing that rights have been
weakened and have taken on the lesser stature of policies).
126 See Tushnet, supra note 114, at 33.
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at this point may be more useful to anti-progressives than progres-
sives. "'
Tushnet describes the proliferation of rights rhetoric in terms of
the deployment of "counter-rights,"' 28 and explains the emergence
of "counter-rights" as follows:
When a court recognizes a claim as a legal right, and
particularly as a constitutional right, it treats the claim as
really important: Rights outweigh ordinary policy concerns,
for example. People on the other side of the issue then
have to respond. They can say, as they often do, that the
court made a mistake. But, at least in the short run, that
may not be a promising strategy. Instead, they can argue
that, although the court found a right on the other side (and
so overrode mere policy objections), it did not consider
whether that right was countered by some other right. That
is, the rhetoric of rights generates a rhetoric of counter-
rights. Against the right to choose, the right to life is
deployed; against affirmative action, the language of
discrimination against white men begins to be used.'29
Because in a given dispute rights are deemed paramount to policy
considerations, the most effective way to oppose a right is to claim
127 See Tushnet, supra note 114, at 33. Mark Tushnet, Carmack Waterhouse
Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center, writes:
[I]f the rhetoric of rights in our culture is individualistic (and if that
sort of individualism is anti-progressive in today's circumstances),
conservatives are more likely than progressives to find the rhetoric of
rights helpful. For example, conservatives have used the rhetoric of
rights to obstruct progressive regulation of property and-in a directly
related field-to challenge campaign finance regulation on the ground
that it violates free speech rights. On this view, progressive victories
are likely to be short-term only; in the longer run the individualism of
rights-rhetoric will stabilize existing social relations rather than
transform them.
Tushnet, supra note 114, at 33.
128 See Tushnet, supra note 114, at 31 (coining the term "counter-rights" and
explaining that counter-rights emerge when a claimed right is opposed with a
countervailing right).
129 Tushnet, supra note 114, at 31.
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a counter-right."'0 Although Tushnet explains the use of counter-
rights in the litigation context, the same dialectic occurs in popular
discourse. As a result, the language of rights has become deprived
of its special power and significance:
[Powerful rights] claims are needed because they are
asserted on behalf of those previously excluded from
serious consideration; having been excluded before, these
groups not only should be allowed to take part in ordinary
politics, they should receive special consideration because
of their prior exclusion. As rights proliferate and generate
counter-rights, the special force attached to the language of
rights dissipates. The distinction between rights and mere
policies weakens, and proponents of rights-claims become
just another interest group in the ordinary play of poli-
tics.13
The use of the language of rights to express wants and needs, and
the expansion in the use of rights rhetoric for polemics that might
have traditionally been centered in policy and not rights, have
deflated the power of asserting a right. Rights assertions are now
routine testimonials, not exceptional claims.
In the mandatory testing context, proponents were quick to
assert that fetal rights are implicated and fetal rights override
women's rights in this context because the health of an infant is
more important than protecting women's privacy.1 32 This has
resulted in a public debate that is predominantly focused on rights;
we are now embroiled in a meaningless dialectic which can only
reify maternal rights and fetal rights. There is no result in this
circular discourse: it is a stalemate, it is without conclusion or
resolution and it is meaningless. The only apparent response to a
rights assertion is, "So what? This one has a right, too." Because
women's rights are not as special as they once were, assertions of
fetal rights are being taken very seriously as rights which place
130 See Tushnet, supra note 114, at 31.
131 Tushnet, supra note 114, at 32.
132 See supra note 108 (quoting authors who believe that the failure to
mandatorily test newborns violates children's rights); Crawford, supra note 96,
at 40.
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limits on women's rights.13 3 The mandatory testing debate, and
of course the abortion debate, forcefully demonstrate that rights
claims by women and pro-choice advocates are not perceived to
carry the same weight that they once did.
It is interesting to note that privacy rights, specifically, are
currently suffering from attack. The New York 7imes recently
reported that because of new medical advances, some former
advocates for special privacy rights for people with AIDS have
changed their minds and begun to press for increased reporting of
HIV cases and mandatory testing.134 Some attribute this shift
away from privacy interests to the change in AIDS demographics,
arguing that the political power of white gay men enabled them to
successfully assert privacy rights when that population was the
focal point of the epidemic. 135 Terry McGovern says she should
have predicted that privacy protections would slip away when the
epidemic shifted to low-income women and women of color. 136
The potential loss of the privacy battle also seems rooted in a
"wider backlash against the idea of privacy" in our postmodern,
mass media culture. 137 However, the cultural movement away
133 See supra note 11 (discussing the increased use of fetal rights rhetoric in
the abortion debate and in fetal endangerment prosecutions).
134 Richardson, supra note 15, at Al, B4 ("The cloak of privacy that has
long set AIDS apart from other infectious diseases, like tuberculosis and syphilis,
is beginning to be pierced, with lawmakers, health officials and even some
advocates for people with the disease pushing for more testing and the mandatory
reporting of those who are infected with H.I.V.").
" See Richardson, supra note 15, at B4 (quoting statements by Professor
Ronald Bayer, Columbia University School of Public Health, and Theresa
McGovern).
136 See Richardson, supra note 15, at B4 (quoting McGovern).
137 Adam Phillips, Grief on Demand, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 7, 1997, at E17. In
commenting on the recent death of Diana, Princess of Wales, and the British
peoples' demand that the Queen express some emotion in public, a psychoanalyst
made some remarks that shed light on the state of privacy today:
Christianity may have democratized privacy with the idea of the
soul; everyone has this secret essence. But privacy has traditionally
been the sign of privilege and power. The affluent have a lot to
protect. The poor, however, are overexposed to everything-sickness,
hunger, need. Indeed, it is part of the cultural legacy of the West to
equate privacy with what we value most.
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from privacy need not be a damaging course, if we can adapt. As
discussed in the next subsection, privacy protections have not been
granted without costs, and it may actually benefit women to
abandon privacy arguments in favor of other polemics that can
achieve similar ends.
If we want to truly address the complexities of the mandatory
testing issue, we must adjust to these shifts in the discursive and
cultural landscape of rights and privacy. Opponents of mandatory
testing must continue asking the question whether mandatory
testing benefits women and children affected by HIV and AIDS and
fighting proponents' focus on rights.
B. Rights and Individualism: Separating HIV-Positive
Pregnant and Childbearing Women from Community,
Fetus and Child and Assigning Blame to Women
An additional problem with rights discourse is that it is
historically individualistic. 3 ' The individualism that is promoted
has two effects that are relevant here: individualism precludes us
from perceiving HIV-infection in women as a communal and
Today, privacy-that is, family life-is considered a haven in a
heartless world. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that our
idealizing of private life is a sign of our despair about political life.
We are addicted to publicity now because we have a lingering
doubt that there may be no such thing as privacy; that the protection
privacy affords might be a protection racket for those who can afford
it. It's as though we are not sure what privacy is for anymore.
Id.
138 See Glendon, supra note 114, at 47-61 (providing a historical analysis of
the development of rights as an individualistic discourse). Glendon writes:
When, in our legal and political discourse, we pay homage to radical
autonomy and self-sufficiency we are not speaking the language of the
frontier or of the Founders. Nor are we using the second languages we
still employ (to varying degrees) in the neighborhood, in religious
communities, or around the kitchen table. We are adopting, rather, the
language and images of certain philosophers and lawyers [such as J. S.
Mill] who, initially at least, were not proposing the product for general
consumption.
Glendon, supra note 114, at 75.
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societal problem'39 and contributes to a perceived opposition
between woman and fetus or child.1
40
It was Karl Marx who first noted the individualistic quality of
the rights of life, liberty and property.' 4' Indeed, rights discourse
"perceives the individual as separated from the community and
prevents individuals from understanding how they are dependent on
one another-how every individual is linked to every other. 14 1
Glendon states that "American rights dialect" pays "extraordinary
homage to independence and self-sufficiency, based on an image of
"' See Glendon, supra note 114, at 48. Tushnet states:
Rights-claims are individualistic.., not because of something inherent
in the concept of rights, but rather because of the historical devel-
opment of the language of rights. The central image of "rights" in our
culture is, as MacKinnon's critique suggests, of a sphere within which
each of us can do what he or she pleases. This image, in turn,
reinforces the distinction between law and politics that is itself subject
to challenge from critical legal studies. Politics is the domain of pure
will or preference, not subject to discussion and deliberation except as
each individual chooses to be influenced by others. Rights--or
law-protect the domain in which political preferences are formed. If,
however, a critic believes that making politics truly social is an
important task, it might be important as well to fight an ideology, the
ideology of rights, that leads people to think of themselves as
disconnected from others in important ways.
Tushnet, supra note 114, at 27 (citing Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281 (1991)).
14o See Baldacci, supra note 98, at 5-11 (discussing how the mandatory
testing debate has presumed an opposition between woman and fetus or child).
41 See Glendon, supra note 114, at 47-48. Marx wrote that in eighteenth
century France and North America, the notion of liberty idealized "man regarded
as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself." Karl Marx, On the Jewish
Question (1843), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 42 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978); see Glendon, supra note 114, at 47. Perceiving rights
to produce separation between individual and community, Marx wrote: "Let us
notice first of all that the so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of
the citizen, are simply the rights of a member of civil society, that is, of egoistic
man, of man separated from other men and from the community." Marx, supra,
at 42.
142 Renata Salecl, Rights in Psychoanalytic and Feminist Perspective, 16
CARDozo L. REv. 1121, 1125 n.8 (1995) (explaining the position of CLS
theorists).
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the rights-bearer as a self-determining, unencumbered, individual,
a being connected to others only by choice."'' 43 Our culture of
individualism, and the belief that we live in a society of free choice
and self-determination,'" typically leads us to the conclusion that
all we need to do is make sure people have their rights. We are
comforted by the conferring of rights because an individual with
vested rights is perceived to be sufficiently protected: the commu-
nity has satisfied its responsibilities to the individual.
In the mandatory testing debate, society looks to confer a right
on either the woman or the fetus or child. However, if policy is
determined solely by conferring rights, the more important analysis
of whether a policy is effective is overlooked. This short-cut, of
determining rights rather than analyzing policy, allows policy-
makers to ignore community and government denial of responsi-
bility for women and children affected by HIV
Proponents of mandatory testing seek to more heavily regulate
women's bodies and take away their "choices" because proponents
have determined that HIV-positive women are infected and
suffering from poverty because they have not been responsible.
However, the assumption upon which mandatory testing is based,
that women have somehow failed, and will continue to fail,
themselves and their infants, 4 ' is made with complete ignorance
to the ways in which women affected by AIDS have been aban-
doned by community and government since the beginning of this
epidemic.
14' Glendon, supra note 114, at 48.
'" Marxist theory suggests that the very concept of "self-determination" is
encumbered by the theory of ideology. See Louis Althusser, Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation), in LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971). Althusser
discusses the fallaciousness of a philosophy of unencumbered "freedom," as he
describes the inescapability of the human subject from an over-arching
ideological frame which has its roots in capitalism, a global structure that negates
the "individual" through commodification. See id.; 1 KARL MARX, Chapter One:
Commodities, in CAPITAL (1867), reprinted in THE MARX-ENGELS READER,
supra note 141, at 302.
145 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing the assumption
that childbearing women will not voluntarily test for HIV).
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For example, there has been a general lack of medical attention
to the impact of AIDS on women and those living in poverty.'"
Throughout the 1980s, the CDC definition of AIDS, which is used
to determine access to subsidized medical care and disability
benefits, did not include the symptoms and diseases of AIDS that
most commonly occur in people living in poverty and in women
but not in men.'47 It was not until a class action lawsuit was
brought against the government that the AIDS definition was
changed to include diseases commonly found in women with AIDS
and the financially disadvantaged.148 Before the definition was
changed, many women and poor people died of AIDS without ever
meeting the CDC definition and without ever receiving needed
benefits.
In addition, many HI V-positive women are excluded from
clinical trials because it is feared that the differences in women's
146 See McKenna, supra note 15, at 137. McKenna states:
Since its discovery in 1981, AIDS has been considered primarily .a
disease of gay men. Despite radical shifts in the demographics of the
populations affected by AIDS, and the fact that the rate of HIV
infection is growing most rapidly in women, this popular misperception
still persists. As a result, physicians may be less likely to be alert to
early symptoms of HIV infection in women or to counsel their female
patients vigorously ....
McKenna, supra note 15, at 137.
147 See Theresa M. McGovern, S.P. v. Sullivan: The Effort to Broaden the
Social Security Administration's Definition of AIDS, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1083, 1087 (1994) (comparing the most typical symptoms of gay white men with
the symptoms of women and those living in poverty). For example, those living
in poverty tend to suffer from extreme, new forms of tuberculosis. See id. at
1087 n.25. Women with AIDS frequently suffer from gynecological problems
such as pelvic inflammatory disease, cervical cancer and chronic yeast infections.
See McKenna, supra note 15, at 137.
141 See S.P. v. Sullivan, No. 90 Civ. 6294 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1996)
(approving a stipulation and order of settlement). HIV Law Project, the same
organization that is currently fighting mandatory testing in the courts, served as
lead counsel for the plaintiffs. The new AIDS definition, promulgated by the
Social Security Administration, took effect on July 1, 1993. See generally
McGovern, supra note 147 (reviewing the history of S.P. v. Sullivan).
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bodies (as compared to men) will confuse results. 149 Women are
also excluded from clinical trials on the grounds that they may
become pregnant and that the potential effects on a fetus are
unknown.' This failure to include women in clinical trials has
several unfortunate effects, including the fact that drugs that have
not been tested on women may not be safe or effective for women,
and that women have fewer opportunities to become one of those
clinical trial participants who have access to the latest, most
effective drugs, free of cost.'1' Furthermore, recent studies have
shown that communities of color are not receiving the same
education about AIDS or access to the latest treatments, such as the
triple combination drug therapies. 52
Although proponents of mandatory testing argue that women
must be coerced because they have failed to voluntarily seek HIV
testing, the evidence indicates that for many years, few women
were encouraged to seek testing by their medical providers or
public health authorities:
149 See McKenna, supra note 15, at 137 n.55; Mary Anne Bobinski, Women
and HIV: A Gender-Based Analysis of a Disease and Its Legal Regulation, 3
TEx. J. WoiEN & L. 7 (1994).
"SO See Hunter, supra note 44, at 14, 15 ("Drug manufacturers and
investigators justify the exclusion of women by their fear of liability for in utero
injuries, which could be the basis for claims by children born with congenital
anomalies."). However, Professor Hunter of Brooklyn Law School notes that
"existing principles of law provide that manufacturers of experimental drugs are
protected from strict liability for harm caused by the drug, provided that they
have adequately warned and obtained consent from test subjects." Hunter, supra
note 44, at 15. The existing law thus calls into question the necessity of drug
companies' policy of excluding women. In addition, there is nothing stopping
drug companies from conducting pre-trial testing to investigate potential harms
to fetuses, as they do other pre-trial investigations, except for apathy and greed.
' Although deaths among women with HIV are up 3%, deaths among men
are down 15%. See At-Risk Populations Experts Gather to Explore Why
American Women Are Fastest Growing Group With HIV, AIDS WKLY. PLUS,
May 19, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11006391. Despite the changing
epidemiologic data, women only constitute 12% of clinical trial participants. See
id.
152 See Minorities Miss Out on AIDS Survival Increase: Campaign Pushes
Education for Patients, Providers, AIDS ALERT, May 1, 1997, at 55 (referring
to statements made by former U.S. Surgeon General Joycelyn Elders).
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the irony is that women have not been protected by the
health system. Public health authorities were slow to warn
women they were at risk for HIV ... and many of her
clients only learned they were infected after they developed
opportunistic infections or their babies became sick.
"Now, what's happening in New York state and across
the country is that medical providers are blaming their
failure (to counsel) on these women. Agreeing to be tested
has less to do with lack of consent and more to do with
not being offered the test.,1
53
A 1988 survey revealed that only 15% of patients recalled talking
to their doctor about AIDS, and that 72% of the reported discus-
sions were initiated by the patient.1 54 In 1991, the same survey
resulted in 19% of patients reporting discussions with their doctors
about AIDS, of which 51% were initiated by the patient.
1 55
Despite the past problems that providers have had in expressing the
need for HIV testing to their patients, especially to populations
other than gay men, mandatory testing proponents assume that any
failure to seek testing by pregnant women is the result of women's
refusal to test.
Recent studies show the contrary. Between 1992 and 1995, the
number of perinatal transmissions dropped 27%.156 The CDC
attributed this decrease to Public Health Service recommendations
that pregnant women be tested for HIV and that HIV-infected
pregnant women take AZT therapy.1 57 The obvious conclusion to
be drawn is that once pregnant women were informed of the need
for them to seek HIV testing, women have done so voluntarily, and
voluntary testing has led to decreases in perinatal transmissions.
The decrease can certainly not be attributed to mandatory testing
because no mandatory testing programs existed until 1997. In
153 Shelton, supra note 21, at 23 (quoting Terry McGovern).
'5 See Shelton, supra note 21, at 23 (referring to a survey based on a
national random sample of 2,000 patients which was published in the American
Journal of Public Health in April 1990).
155 See Shelton, supra note 21, at 23.
156 See Fewer Infants Acquire AIDS from Mothers, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22,
1996, at A20.
157 See id.
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addition, use of AZT by HIV-infected pregnant women rose from
17 to 80% as a result of CDC recommendations. 5  Despite
increasingly powerful evidence that voluntary counseling and
testing programs work, mandatory testing proponents still assume
that coercive regulation is necessary.
The push for greater regulation of HIV-positive childbearing
women must be partly motivated by the assumption that women
infected with HIV are irresponsible, bad mothers who do not care
for their fetuses and infants. This perception reflects racist
stereotypes. The moral judgments imposed on low-income women
and women of color who are pregnant and HIV-infected derive
from a history of general devaluation of Black motherhood and
mothers with little or no income. 159 The problems of HIV-
infection, drug addiction, poverty and lack of access to medical
care are often characterized as the private failures of poor women
and women of color.16 As a result, larger social issues that need to
be addressed by those outside the Black, Hispanic and other
affected communities are obscured.
158 See id.
159 See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies:
Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419,
1437-40 (1991). Enslaved African-American women were perceived as sexual
objects to be raped and abused, whose only purpose was to work and produce
more slaves. See id. Dorothy Roberts, Professor of Law at Rutgers, Newark,
discusses the common slave-owner practice of whipping pregnant women while
they were lying face down in the dirt, with a hole that was dug out just large
enough for their stomachs in order that the fetus would not be injured. See id.
at 1438. Roberts writes that this "serves as a powerful metaphor for the evils of
a fetal protection policy that denies the humanity of the mother." Id.
Such racist attitudes continue today when we look at the present dispropor-
tionate removal of black children from their mothers' custody and sterilization
abuses. See id. at 1440-44. Regarding the widespread practices of coerced and
non-consensual sterilization practices on women of color, Roberts notes that, in
effect, "sterilization is the only publicly-funded birth control method readily
available to poor women of color." Id. at 1444. Court ordered medical
procedures in general are performed disproportionately on pregnant women of
color. See id. at 1457 n. 197.
160 See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection
of the Ideology of Motherhood, The Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the
Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1211-22 (1992).
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Similar to the separation between women and the larger
community, rights discourse instills a separateness between woman
and fetus.'61 A right is "something to which one has a just claim:
as . . .the power or privilege to which one is justly entitled." '162
Rights give license to do something against something or someone
else; rights are tempered only by other rights. 16 3 In the mandatory
testing context, policy analysts debate who has a right to protection
and autonomy: does the woman have a right of privacy and choice,
or does the child have a right to identification of HIV and treat-
ment?16 Within this opposition, the woman is perceived to be in
a position of power, and the fetus or child is perceived as an
innocent victim who must be protected. 65 This limited discourse
precludes consideration of policies that might aid both woman and
child without placing them in opposition. However, the two-patient
model "is being accepted with little consideration being given to
the potential harm of describing pregnancy as the source of
conflict."
66
161 A historically earlier model for the maternal-fetus relationship was one
of interdependence, which was reflected in the law because fetuses had very few
legal interests. See id. at 1293. This began to change with the sonogram and
other technological advances which have enabled physicians to view the fetus as
a separate patient. See id.
162 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1008 (10th ed. 1995).
163 See Tushnet, supra note 114, at 31; supra notes 128-31 and accom-
panying text (discussing counter-rights).
"6 Professor Lisa Ikemoto of Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, notes that
the two-patient model promotes conflict and opposition. See Ikemoto, supra note
160, at 1293-94 ("The important point is that once the two-patient model is
accepted, conflict is assumed to be inevitable. This conflict is a cultural
construct, not the result of 'pure science."').
165 See Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1293-94.
166 See Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1293-94. In discussing the proliferation
of criminal prosecutions for fetal-endangerment, one author writes:
Rights discourse evinces an adversarial, individualistic perspective of
social interaction that distorts the maternal-fetalrelationship by forcing
women to see their fetuses as things which curtail their own rights.
Fetal rights discourse places the duty to promote infant well-being, a
responsibility which belongs to the community as well as to individ-
uals, upon individual pregnant women alone. Arguing that a fetus has
a right to be born healthy deflects attention from underlying questions
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The discourse of fetal rights and the constructed opposition
between mother and fetus have emerged as a way of explaining and
addressing what is really a larger social problem. Ikemoto states
that the ideology of the "good mother," who is white, "noble,"
"benign" and "self-sacrificing," has enabled the dominant culture
to ignore the obstacles that low-income women and women of color
face because of their impoverishment, race and social status and to
script social and economic oppression as the private failures of
irresponsible mothers. 67 Because low-income women and women
of color are seen as not conforming with the traditional icon of
white, middle-class motherhood, they are punished for their
perceived ineptitude, 6 ' even though they do not have the same
access to economic, medical and social support as their white
middle-class counterparts. 69 Ikemoto writes:
Women of color, those who live in poverty, and those
made outsiders by virtue of cultural or religious practices
of social policy. By setting the problems of infant addiction and
mortality in a framework specific to individual women, rights discourse
obscures the statistical reality that fetal rights practices have counter-
productive results.
Deborah J. Krauss, Regulating Women's Bodies: The Adverse Effect of Fetal
Rights Theory on Childbirth Decisions and Women of Color, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 523, 544 (1991).
167 Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1211-12. Ikemoto writes:
Social problems, then, could be explained as a failure in the private
sphere-the failure to sustain motherhood as an institution, and the
failure of individual women to meet the standards of the calling. As a
result, fear of social disorder has often been expressed by regulating
women as mothers. That is, society responds to problems in ways that
elaborate upon the ideology of motherhood. One traditional way of
regulating women is fairly straightforward-by promulgating laws that
restrict women to the private sphere roles of mother and wife.
Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1211-12.
16' The punishment is the increased regulation of their bodies and of
motherhood in general. See Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1211-12.
169 See Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1207. See also Roberts, supra note 159,
at 1422 ("[Poor women of color] are the least likely to obtain adequate prenatal
care, the most vulnerable to government monitoring, and the least able to
conform to the white, middle-class standard of motherhood. They are therefore
the primary targets of government control.").
237
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
are stigmatized by the dominant society and are never
presumed good mothers, as are white middle- and upper-
class women. In addition, even while outsider women are
subject to the white-middle-class-good-mother standard,
direct and indirect state actions expressing patriarchal
norms deprive these women of the material, political, and
social resources to conform to [that standard]."' 0
The discourse of rights thus serves to further obscure gender and
racial subordination by positing an individual, without context or
community, to sink or swim on her own, regardless of the
numerous obstacles that dominant culture and ill-conceived political
and regulatory schemes have placed in her way.
Despite the failure of the government and community to
adequately educate women about AIDS and to provide access to
medical care for impoverished women, and despite the success rates
of voluntary counseling and testing programs, proponents of
mandatory testing assume that pregnant women with HIV are to
blame for their situation,' cannot be trusted to make medical
decisions with the help of counseling, and, consequently, should be
treated like incompetents and subjected to government intervention.
Where women and AIDS are concerned, the responsibility of the
community is erased, women are presumed guilty despite history
and evidence to the contrary, and the problem of fetal health is
placed on women alone. 172 Given the history of women and
AIDS, it is a great injustice to ignore the discrimination and
obstacles that have been placed in the way of HI-positive women
and to make policy decisions based on who has a greater right,
woman or child.
Proponents of forced testing inaccurately characterize oppo-
nents' arguments as being centered around women's privacy rights.
This is an effective tactic because privacy rights may perpetuate an
ideology which promotes the isolation and abandonment of women
170 Ikemoto, supra note 160, at 1207.
171 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text (discussing proponents'
assumption that women will not voluntarily test for HIV, despite the success of
aggressive counseling and testing programs).
172 See Krauss, supra note 166, at 544.
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with fIV Glendon asserts that "[n]o aspect of American rights
discourse more tellingly illustrates the isolated character of the
rights-bearer than our protean right of privacy. ' 3 While privacy
rights initially sprung from a tradition of limited government, 4
privacy rights in the American liberal tradition have evolved into
"the right to enjoy life" and "the right to be let alone.' 75 It is
Glendon's contention that women and other disenfranchised groups
are not served by these privacy rights:
By exalting autonomy to the degree we do, we systema-
tically slight the very young, the severely ill or disabled,
the frail elderly, as well as those who care for them-and
impair their own ability to be free and independent in so
doing. Our insistence, even in divorce law, that self-
sufficiency should be the goal for everyone, in practice
leaves women bearing the brunt of responsibility for
children and other persons in need of care, while running
the main risk of family dissolution.
76
Glendon provides a dark and sobering example of the double-edged
sword of privacy rights with an allusion to the epitome of women's
privacy rights litigation, Roe v. Wade: '
77
In Roe, Justice Blackmun had stated reassuringly that the
pregnant woman was not to be 'isolated' in her privacy.
But when the Court faced the issue head-on in actual cases
concerning whether abortion funding should be available to
her, or whether states could require women seeking
abortions to be provided with information regarding
alternatives such as adoption, or assistance available to
them if they wished to bring the pregnancy to term, the
paradigm of the lone rights-bearer prevailed.
7 8
173 Glendon, supra note 114, at 48.
174 See Glendon, supra note 114, at 49 (discussing the writings of
Blackstone).
175 Glendon, supra note 114, at 51-52 (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis
D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193, 197 (1890)).
176 Glendon, supra note 114, at 74-75.
'77 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178 Glendon, supra note 114, at 59.
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Glendon notes that Norma McCorvey, also known as "Jane Roe,"
won her privacy right-the right to a legal abortion-but then truly
was "let alone."' 9 "No one, apparently, had been willing to help
her either to have the abortion she desired, or to keep and raise the
child who was eventually born. While the litigation was still
pending, she surrendered the infant for adoption. Years later, she
was fruitlessly searching for her son or daughter . 180
V BEYOND RIGHTS?
Because the power of asserting a right has been weakened by
the popular proliferation of rights language and because rights
discourse has served to isolate HIV-infected women from society
and their infants and helped to rationalize coercive regulatory
policy, the focus on maternal and fetal rights in the mandatory
testing debate has greatly assisted proponents in realizing their goal
of the nationwide adoption of mandatory testing. The question
remains: can we speak of abandoning rights discourses which have
historically provided people of color and women with some legal
protection from discrimination? Because rights discourses have
been employed to fight racism and other forms of systematic
disempowerment of specific groups of people, the critique of rights
has been attacked by Critical Race Theorists."8 '
Professor Kimberle Crenshaw of UCLA Law School writes that
the "trashing" of rights discourses "may have the unintended conse-
quence of disempowering the racially oppressed while leaving
179 See Glendon, supra note 114, at 58 (discussing McCorvey's personal
history and famous venture into the American justice system).
'go Glendon, supra note 114, at 58.
See generally PATRICIA J. WLLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND
RIGHTS (1991) (arguing that CLS's abandonment of rights in favor of a discourse
of needs is insufficient); Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1331 (1988) (criticizing the CLS view of rights and arguing that
African-Americans cannot afford to abandon rights arguments). For a collection
of works by Critical Race Theorists, see CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTINo
EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
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white supremacy basically untouched." ' 2 Crenshaw argues that
the focus of Critical Legal Studies..3 on ideologically-induced
consent to discourses that legitimate the domination and subordina-
tion of marginalized people, such as rights discourses, underempha-
sizes a more material coercion that is occurring through racial
domination.184 "[C]onsensus and coercion can be understood
together: ideology convinces one group that the coercive domina-
tion of another is legitimate."'8 5
Crenshaw acknowledges the problematic effects of relying on
rights discourses. She writes that "the Critics are correct in
observing that, despite [the gains of the civil rights movement],
engaging in rights discourse has helped to deradicalize and co-opt
the challenge in the current period, in which racial oppression
continues to flourish behind the screen of racial equality.' 8 6
However, because African-Americans cannot afford to abandon
rights as a primary method of "self-defense," Crenshaw suggests
that African-Americans must find ways to continue using rights in
182 Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 1357-58.
183 See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing the CLS
critique of rights and CLS theories of law).
184 Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 1358.
18. Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 1358. For Crenshaw it is significant that
African-Americans were originally excluded from the discourse of rights
altogether. The civil rights movement was radical because of the very proposition
that African-Americans should have rights and it was only with the civil rights
movement that Whites were forced to respond to Black demands. See Crenshaw,
supra note 181, at 1359, 1366.
186 Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 1370. The utility of using legal forums for
redressing racial domination, inequality and discrimination has been questionable
since the Supreme Court decided Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(establishing that the mere showing of a law's disproportionate effect on
minorities is not sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny). Davis' requirement that a
challenged law have a discriminatory purpose has greatly limited the availability
of legal redress against laws that disfavor people of color, especially as facially
discriminatory laws and express racism have diminished in favor of a highly
institutionalized, more covert racism. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (discussing unconscious racism and the doctrine of
discriminatory purpose and proposing an alternative means of evaluating laws
that foster racial discrimination).
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the waging of political struggles, but minimize the detrimental
effects of engaging in a discourse that inherently legitimates the
established order. 7 Crenshaw concludes that "Blacks are ulti-
mately presented with a dilemma: liberal reform both transforms
and legitimates. Even though legal ideology absorbs, redefines, and
limits the language of protest, African-Americans cannot ignore the
power of legal ideology to counter some of the most repressive
aspects of racial domination."'
8 8
Ultimately, it may not be possible to limit the use of rights
discourse to when it is politically expedient, or to minimize the
detrimental effects of rights discourse when it is wielded. The
teachings of French philosopher Michel Foucault suggest that rights
discourse is an integral and inseparable part of the relations of
power; it is therefore futile to engage in a discourse that merely
perpetuates the same power relations.8 9 "The subject becomes
part of [a legal-discursive] game when it articulates its relation to
power in the apparently neutral language of fundamental rights and
freedoms."' 9 In addition, some feminists propose that the indi-
'8 See Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 1387.
188 Crenshaw, supra note 181, at 1370.
189 See Salecl, supra note 142, at 1122 (discussing the theories of Foucault
and other theorists working within Foucauldian frameworks); see generally 1
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976). The Foucauldian position is that "in
resisting unjust laws, there is no need to appeal to some universal idea of human
rights because it is unproductive to judge power relations in terms that are part
of the relations of power." Salecl, supra note 142, at 1122. Under this theory,
when rights are invoked they merely "justify a strategy of power in a specific
legal-discursive game." Salecl, supra note 142, at 1122. These aspects of
Foucauldian theory are somewhat consistent with Kennedy and Gabel's belief
that rights discourse diverts attention from power relations and the exercise of
dominion and control. See Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 114, at 36 (stating that
we need to monitor power, and not rights).
Mandatory testing arguments framed in terms of rights and counter-rights
divert attention from the exercise of dominion over the bodies of low-income
women and women of color and shift attention, instead, to the respective rights
of the woman and fetus. Proponents of mandatory testing have forced the public
into a "legal-discursive game" that precludes interrogation of mandatory testing
as a public health policy. See Salecl, supra note 142, at 1122.
190 Salecl, supra note 142, at 1122.
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vidual subject of rights discourse is inherently masculine; working
from a rights framework will not promote change but inevitably
subject women to subordination and control.'91 According to this
analysis, rights discourses reify and legitimate a system of
domination and subordination, and any use of rights, successful or
not for a particular problem, will ultimately only reaffirm the
established order.
Because rights discourse is so deeply ideological it is unlikely
that rights can be employed only at strategic moments so as to
escape legitimizing the established order. It is also unlikely that
rights discourse is going to be abandoned, in the mandatory testing
debate or anywhere else, and it is questionable whether outsider
groups can afford to abandon rights and risk further subordination.
The problem of rights feels insurmountable.
Patricia Williams, Professor of Law at Columbia Law School,
offers some interesting comments in her discussion of the CLS
critique of rights. Williams writes that CLS theorists have urged the
abandonment of rights and merely replaced rights discourse with a
discourse of needs.'92 That is, CLS theorists propose that the best
alternative to asserting rights is to argue that the disadvantaged and
marginalized need housing, assistance, and so on. Williams'
response to this is that African-Americans have fruitlessly
expressed their needs for centuries:
Such statements ... about the relative utility of needs
over rights discourse overlook that blacks have been
describing their needs for generations. They overlook a
long history of legislation against the self-described needs
of black people. While it is no longer against the law to
191 Many feminist theorists posit that, in history and language, women are
excluded from philosophies of "human rights," which are essentially men's
rights. See Salecl, supra note 142, at 1126. These schools of feminism expose the
individualism of rights and the masculinity of the unitary subject. Salecl, supra
note 142, at 1126-27. Under this kind of feminist analysis, the notion of the
unitary subject fails to account for women, who are "not essentially, necessarily,
inevitably, invariably, always, and forever separate from other human beings:
women, distinctively, are quite clearly 'connected' to another human life when
pregnant." Salecl, supra note 142, at 1127.
192 Williams, supra note 181, at 146-53.
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teach black people to read, there is still within the national
psyche a deep, self-replicating strain of denial of the urgent
need for a literate black population. ('They're not intel-
lectual,' 'They can't...') In housing, in employment, in
public and private life, it is the same story: the undesired
needs of black people transform them into those-without-
desire. ('They're lazy,' 'They don't want to...')
For blacks, describing needs has been a dismal failure
as political activity. It has succeeded only as a literary
achievement. 193
Williams proposes that the struggle is not to abandon rights or
create statements about need, but rather "to find a political
mechanism that can confront the denial of need."'"
Rights discourse has structured and confined the terms of the
mandatory testing debate so that the public can only perceive the
mandatory testing issue in very limited ways. The task before us is
to continue to recognize the limitations of rights discourse and
attempt to counteract its tendencies to isolate and blame women,
people of color and the poor. Perhaps the goal of defeating
mandatory testing policies may be reached partly by challenging
assumptions about HIV-affected women and children and exposing
social failures to support women affected by HIV
CONCLUSION
By exposing the erroneous assumption that fetal health is
protected by mandatory testing and by uncovering the damaging
effects of coercive testing, opponents of mandatory testing can
more effectively argue against this destructive policy. In the
opposition to mandatory testing, the solutions cannot be found in
a public debate about rights and counter-rights. Opponents of any
form of mandatory IRV testing of infants and pregnant women
need to continue trying to reframe the current discourse around this
problem. In the debates to come, we must concentrate our resources
on characterizing mandatory HIV testing as bad public health
193 Williams, supra note 181, at 151 (emphasis in original).
194 Williams, supra note 181, at 152 (emphasis in original).
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policy, exposing the false assumptions behind the "save the babies"
rhetoric, and demonstrating how low-income women and women
of color are abandoned by government and scapegoated for larger
social problems.

